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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of the competing interests and pressures on Maritime
Administrations in aspiring maritime states (AMS) and their impacts on the rights of
such states in the discharge of their obligations under international law.
The evolutionary changes in the maritime interests of states are examined including
the historical interests of traditional maritime states, the development of the flags of
convenience/open registry system, the advent of AMS to maritime affairs in the last
25 years, the nature of their maritime interests and the factors that give rise to them,
and the competing interests and conflicts resulting from these changes. The
interactions and conflicts of the national interests of AMS, vis a vis the open registry
system, with the interests of other state and non-state maritime actors and the
impacts of those interactions and conflicts on Maritime Administrations in AMS are
analysed.
The rights and responsibilities maritime states in international law, the performance
of AMS in the conduct of maritime affairs relative to their rights and responsibilities
and the impacts of pressures which impede the performance of Maritime
Administrations in AMS are all examined.
The likely changes in competing maritime interests influenced by globalisation and
the events of September 11, 2001 are examined and the implications of the choices
made by AMS in the conduct of their maritime affairs in light of these anticipated
changes and the pressures on AMS are analysed. Finally the impact of competing
interests and the pressures on AMS are summarised and measures are
recommended to strengthen their Maritime Administrations.
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CHAPTER 1
1.0 Introduction
Shipping, regarded by many as the only truly global industry, has long been
considered essential to trade and vital to the interests of states. Trade is considered
to be the engine of economic growth. Within the last 25 years many states, which
have not traditionally been involved in major maritime activities, have opted to
become involved in the provision of maritime services. Most of these states have
developing economies, characterised by limited financial, material and human
resources. Despite these limitations, many have undertaken the highest possible
level of responsibilities, becoming flag states with registered tonnages beyond their
immediate national requirement, an undertaking which requires an administrative
mechanism to regulate and control the activities of their ships globally. These are
the aspiring maritime states (AMS) of today.

While their choice to enter into

maritime affairs is perfectly legitimate, they have been engulfed in a complex array
of pre-existing and competing interests.

AMS have been accused of joining the ranks of “flags of convenience” (FOCs) that
neglect their duties and obligations to regulate shipping and promote economic
gains at the expense of maritime safety and environmental protection (MSEP). The
International Transport Workers Federation [ITF] (2000a) views FOCs as
subterfuges that encourage substandard shipping, lead to abuse of seafarers and
harbour conditions that encourage maritime fraud. Since the 1940’s, it has been
campaigning against FOCs in the hope that they will eventually cease to exist.
Alderton & Winchester (2002, p. 39) opine that new FOCs promote themselves as
providers of ship registry services without any notion of regulation and they attract
unscrupulous shipowners who only wish to escape regulatory burdens. 1 Citing
1

The terms `open registry´ and `flag of convenience´ are used interchangeably throughout this
dissertation.
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complexities Damas (2002a, p. 63) states “`you cannot group (open registries)
together and say: `national flags equal good and open registry equals bad.´” He
presents arguments to show that performance ratings for some FOCs are better
than many national or so-called closed registries. The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2001, p. 54) is of the view that
substandard shipping distorts economic competition and substandard operators gain
up to 15% profit over operators who conform to regulatory standards. Whether or
not that is true, John Horrocks, Secretary General of the International Chamber of
Shipping, states that “open registries are `the only way to compete in the
international market´”. (Mottley, 2002, p. 64). Following the events of September 11,
2001, Gillis (2002, p. 60) posits that due to the lack of transparency “[s]ome fear
flags of convenience serve as conduits for terrorist activities“. Mottley (2002, p. 64)
is of the contrary view. He outlines that “probably the best source for absolute
transparency and accurate information … reside with the larger open registries …”.
Despite these arguments against open registries, the percentage of world shipping
registered with open registries continues to increase. As at the year 2001, 62.4% of
world shipping remains registered with open registries. (Damas, 2002b, p. 62).

The purpose of this study is to determine the impact of the competing interests and
pressures on Maritime Administrations in AMS and how it affects the rights of such
states in the discharge of their obligations under international law.

In chapter 2, the evolutionary changes in maritime interests are examined beginning
with

the historical interests

of

traditional maritime

states (TMS).

The

internationalization of shipping through the open registry system and the
commencement of attendant conflicts are explored and the nature of maritime
interests is evaluated. The advent of AMS in international shipping, the nature of
their interests, the factors which gave rise to them and the conflicts their interests
are likely to cause are all examined.

In chapter 3, the rights and duties of maritime states under the existing international
legal regime, the sources of international maritime law and their binding obligations
on states parties are examined.

The duties and responsibilities of flag states,
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coastal states and port states with specific focus on the regulation of shipping and
the primary responsibility of flag states in this regard are set out. The way in which
states and industry combine to provide a safety net around shipping for the
purposes of maritime safety and environmental protection (MSEP) is examined.

In chapter 4, the nature of maritime interests, the manner in which they are pursued,
the strategies and strategic alliances employed in their pursuit, the resultant
competing interests and conflicts and their impacts on AMS, in their primary capacity
as flag states, are analysed. Competing interests and conflicts with TMS, ports as
well

as

intra-flag

state

conflicts

with

classification

societies,

overseas

representatives and shipowners are also analysed.

In chapter 5, the performance of Maritime Administrations in AMS, against their
responsibilities outlined in international law is assessed. The questions of whether
AMS have contributed to substandard shipping; if they have provided adequate
resources in support of their Maritime administrations; whether their commercial
considerations have overridden MSEP; and if AMS have properly utilized the
support available under the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Integrated
Technical Co-operation Programme (ITCP) are all explored.

In chapter 6, the impact of globalisation and the events of September 11, 2001 on
the global maritime and security environment and the changes, strategies, strategic
alliances that are likely to cause are examined. The implications of the choices
made by AMS in the conduct of their maritime affairs, the competing interests, the
prevailing pressures and the strategies and alliances anticipated as a result of the
changes in the global maritime environment are examined.

Finally, in the last chapter, it is concluded that competing interests and their
associated conflicts are permanent features of international maritime affairs that
have had mixed but mostly negative impacts on Maritime Administrations in AMS. It
is concluded that it is largely within the power of AMS, by their conduct of their
maritime affairs, to control the impact of competing interests and pressures. Many
AMS have not lived up to their responsibilities. Their Maritime Administrations have
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remained weak and underdeveloped mostly due to their own choices. Measures to
strengthen Maritime Administrations in AMS to ensure more effective discharge of
their MSEP and security responsibilities and to meet their objectives in keeping with
national interests are also set out.

In attempting to objectively assess the performance of AMS in chapter 5, some
difficulties were encountered due to the lack of any globally established mechanism
for assessing the performance of flag states and establishing benchmarks for what
is “substandard”. A table combining flag state ratings from several sources was
developed.

However, there were still some limitations as information was not

available or not applicable in all categories for all registries/flags. It was observed
that assessment criteria and results differed even among similar agencies. In some
instances, the ratings for a single flag/registry varied significantly where different
assessment mechanisms were used.

It was however felt that the available

information provided a reasonable basis for the assessment.
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CHAPTER 2
2.0
2.1

The Evolutionary Changes in Maritime Interests

The Historical Interests of Traditional Maritime States

From the time man became hewers of wood and learnt to strap logs together in the
form of rafts, he began to use the sea as a medium for fulfilment of social and other
aspirations. History is replete with examples of peoples everywhere using basic
transport – rafts, dugout canoes and the like – to cross the seas, to lands near and
far, in search of new opportunities and better standards of living. As interests in new
lands, riches, economic activities and trade became greater, maritime transport
evolved in size, capacity and international importance.

Sir Walter Raleigh,

describing the early policy operating in traditional maritime states (TMS), stated,
“Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the
trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world
itself.” (Peele, 1997, p. 61).

So, Britain for example, a small country, of relatively

limited natural resources, became “Great”, commanding a worldwide colonial empire.
By the 15th through to the 19th century, there was widespread exploration of far off
lands and colonization, primarily by European states, that employed centuries-old
mercantile practices in trade to extract prized riches from colonies for the
enhancement of the colonial powers. These states developed large merchant fleets
and naval forces to service and defend the confluence of political, economic, trade
and military/strategic objectives inherent in their maritime interests.
Donovan, 2000, pp. 11, 26).

(Gibson &

In the quid pro quo which became custom and

international law, ships trading under the flag of their state had the right to naval
escort that provided protection against piracy and capture by other states. In return
they were under obligation to support naval operations through transportation of
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troops and war material. Through this strategic alliance, the political, economic and
military/strategic objectives of the state and the private commercial profit-making
interests of shipowners for financial gain were met.

To support trade, lower risks and ensure reliability of shipping, other maritime
industries and services such as shipbuilding, marine insurance and ship surveying
also developed within these states. In time, these spin-off industries and services
also generated considerable economic activities and wealth. These colonial powers
emerged as leading maritime nations and came to be regarded as “traditional
maritime states”.

Over the past 50 years, states’ economies have become more dependent on trade.
In the year 2000, 5.88 billion tons of commodity, estimated to be 90% of world trade
by volume, was transported by sea. This figure is projected to rise to 7.13 billion by
2010. (Ma, 2002, pp. 16,18). With economies projected to become even more
dependent on trade in the future, there is no rationale for changes to the historical
interests of TMS.

2.2

Emergence of the Open Registry System

Open registry has been called by many names including “flags of convenience”
(FOCs). “FOCs have otherwise been called `flags of necessity´, `free flags´, `flags
of opportunity´, `piratical flags´, `facilitating flags´, `shadow flags´, `cheap flags´,
`flags of accommodation´ and so on”. However, the term used depends on the
views, perspectives and interests of the defining party. (Metaxas, 1985, p.14).

A product of states’ political, economic and military interests as well as economic
interests of shipowners, there is evidence to show that FOCs operated in the
Mediterranean during the 18th century involving Greek, French, Turkish, Genovese,
Austrian and Russian flags. There is also documentary evidence of shipowners
changing flag to minimize costs and of inter-state rivalry for commercial supremacy.
The latter evidences political and economic interests, with hegemonic policy
objectives. (Metaxas, 1985, pp. 8-11).
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2.2.1

The Panamanian Experience

Carlisle (1981, pp. 1-2) credits the genesis of the modern-day open registry to
Panama.

It started as an accidental by-product of post World War I (WWI)

Panamanian governmental initiative. The objective was to stimulate growth in the
national maritime sector by encouraging ownership of vessels by nationals and
corporate citizens through attractive fiscal conditions. United States (US) owned
Panamanian corporations took advantage of the system to register vessels in
Panama in order to escape high labour cost in the US and punitive duties on their
vessels repaired outside that country.
Following the transfer of Resolute and Reliance, major passenger liners of
prominence and prestige in 1922, the Panamanian government recognized the
revenue earning capacity of vessel registration and its potential to positively impact
socio-economic development. Panama, in response to requests from shipowners,
moved to seize the income generating opportunity, by enacting its 1925 Maritime
Code with liberal provisions and slightly higher charges aimed at easing a mid
1920’s revenue crisis. (Carlisle, 1981, p. 21). After WWI, US corporate shipowners
purchased and registered ex-US government wartime vessels in Panama. Disposal
in this way satisfied the private, commercial profit-making interests of shipowners
through the removal of government involvement in business “ideas deeply rooted in
American ideological perceptions”. (Carlisle, 1981, pp. xv).
The transfer of Resolute and Reliance from the American to the Panamanian
registry evoked national and international outcry. Among the reasons the owners
gave to justify the transfer was Attorney General Harry Daugherty’s ruling on the
Volstead Act that prohibited liquor on board thereby rendering them uncompetitive,
compared with foreign cruise liners. However, the critical advantage was savings on
crew wages of $17,000 and $18,000 for each ship. (Carlisle, 1981, p. 17).

There

was also service convenience. Registration could be accomplished while traversing
the Panama Canal without deviation from the Atlantic-Pacific trade routes while US
Panamanian subsidiary corporations performed multiple services on behalf of these
ships. (Carlisle, 1981, p. 2).
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The owners of Resolute and Reliance also claimed that a study showed that
Panama had no interest in developing its navy or merchant marine to compete with
the US and that the merchant fleet would be available to the US in times of military
necessity.

2

Retention of vessels by US citizens was vital to US national

military/strategic interests and Panama represented no threat to US political and
economic interests.
Panama.

The US Government therefore supported registration in

This military/strategic convenience, officially endorsed by the US

Government and later called “effective United States control”’ was used during the
early part of World War II (WWII) to circumvent US neutrality laws by having
American owned Panamanian registered ships support Allied war efforts. (Carlisle,
1981, pp. 144-148). 3 Here, like in early European practices, there was strategic
alignment of private and public interests.

Provisions for high labour costs and punitive measures for US registered vessels
repaired outside that country were enshrined in its laws. European states had laws
providing for large social security payments, large crews with high wages and
double taxation (on company profit and on income tax), considered onerous by
shipowners. Shipowners in the US and in Europe transferred their ships to the
Panamanian registry that had no such charges. Deterrents operating in the US and
Europe against use of their own flag appear to have had greater influence on the
decisions to change registry than the attractions offered by registration.

In the

depression years of the 1930’s, the Panama registry was a “flag of necessity”
providing for “removal of a handicap rather than the gaining of an advantage”. 4
(Rochdale, 1970, p.52)

2

Despite lack of evidence, Carlisle (1981, p.16) is of the view that “[t]his remarkable assertion of
private decision-making power of questions of foreign policy suggested that the study had been
conducted by the State or War Department or at least in consultation with those departments”.
Sullivan and Nelson, legal counsel for the owners of Reliance and Resolute had been instrumental in
arranging the legal details of Panama’s independence, characterized by its Panama’s dependence on
the United States. Prior to 1920, the American military had intervened in Panama on four occasions
and had the capacity to do so again if they wished to take by force beneficially owned US vessels to
support naval operations.
3
The US Navy concluded that there was “effective control” over US owned vessels registered in
Panama, Liberia, Honduras, Venezuela and the Phillipines.
4
The Rochdale Report, actually used the term “flags of convenience” and not open registry.
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During WWII, US policy on neutrality changed going from covert aid to open
cooperation with Britain as the war progressed. The US Government pressured
Panama to allow use of its flag for American defined pro-Allied support and
preventing it being used by Japan and Germany.

Under explicit orders from

President Roosevelt on 31 April 1941, US shipowners began arming their ships
registered in Panama. (Carlisle, 1981, pp. 78-87).

President Arias of Panama,

fearing his country would be dragged into war ordered registration of all armed ships
cancelled on 7th October 1941. Three days later, while in Cuba on holidays, Arias
was overthrown by a faction of his cabinet with US endorsement. US endorsement
of the coup d’etat was rewarded by a reversal of the ship registry cancellation order
10 days later. (Carlisle, 1981, pp. 90-95).

In 1948, anti-American riots in Panama led to the rejection, by the Panamanian
Assembly, of a treaty to extend US bases in Panama for 30 years. Arias, accused
of pro-facist sympathies, was re-elected. Despite being deposed yet again, he was
reinstated to office within 7 days.

US shipowners feared their ships might be

confiscated by Panama. The system that protected their private commercial gain
was unreliable.

In the face of increased post-WWII shipping competition from

European, labour protests, a Panamanian registry system slow to reforms, unstable
political conditions in Panama and Panamanian consular services susceptible to
corruption, the Panamanian registry was no longer convenient for the interests of
US shipowners.

2.2.2

The Rise of the Liberian Flag

With backing from the Liberian government, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., a former US
corporate director and Secretary of State in President Roosevelt’s wartime cabinet,
established, in 1947, Stettinius Associates – Liberia, Incorporated, as “a profitsharing arrangement with the Liberian government” to direct private economic aid to
“implement plans for Liberian development”. (Carlisle, 1981, p. 118).

Several

members of Stettinius Associates were former high-ranking US officials that served
with Stettinius during WWII in economic and foreign relations and in the military.
They had private maritime interests operating tankers under the Panamanian
registry.
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In 1947, Stettinius Associates, while continuing to reap the benefits of Panamanian
registration, quietly set about drafting a tailor-made Liberian maritime code, intended
to supplant the Panamanian registry and serve their future interests and to
monopolize oil and ore transportation into and out of Liberia.

Before being

submitted to the government of Liberia for enactment, the draft code was secretly
vetted and given “final approval” by US shipping firms, as Stettinius Associates lined
up transfers from the Panamanian to the Liberian flag. ESSO, one of the vetting
firms, was to participate in the registry operation and to gain revenue from
registration of its own ships. (Carlisle, 1981, pp. 119-123).

In a brief to US governmental aides, Stettinius exploited geo-political and
military/strategic fears, emphasizing the “strategic position of Liberia from the
standpoint of US protection of the Panama Canal and Brazil” from invasion, referring
to Liberia as America’s “sole beachhead in Africa” and noting that if the company
failed, “Communism already at work in Africa, would rejoice”. (Carlisle, 1981, p.
119).

Although the US State Department claimed deliberate, almost fraudulent

misrepresentation by Stettinius Associates, the plan was accepted as part of
“effective United States control”.

The State Department insisted on a review of the draft maritime code. During the
period of the review, Stettinuis Associates urged Liberian President Tubman to pass
the draft into law, as any delay would jeopardize revenue from ships waiting to be
registered. Tubman’s government, considering public developmental interests and
under pressure to generate revenue in keeping with electoral promises, hastily
passed the draft into law without adequate review.

Unlike the Panamanian Maritime Code and ship registry system that slowly evolved
at the urging of American shipowners, the Liberian Maritime Code was meticulously
tailor-designed for shipowners, offering the same tax free facilities.

The State

Department’s thorough review led to rectification of its flaws, providing among other
things, the basis for registration of mortgages and issue of certificates of registration.
Compared to Panama’s laws, it provided a superior legal and administrative
framework. Through a corporate structure, administered by personnel with business
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experience, there was better control of ships, conduct of ship registration and
prevention of corruption in a politically stable environment.

By 1956, Liberia

surpassed Panama’s tonnage. (Carlisle, 1981, pp.130-133).

2.2.3

Competition, Conflicts and the Image of the Open Registry

As soon as the Liberian flag began to attract vessels to its registry, the Liberian and
Panamanian flags became targets of widespread and better organized attacks from
labour and from shipowners in TMS. US shipowners who dominated wartime trade
faced increased competition from a recovering European shipping industry.
European shipowners and labour unions, supported by their governments, protested
that Panama and Liberia supported evasion of taxes and currency regulations and
lowered safety, social and labour standards.
The European labour protests against “PanLibHon” 5 registries received support
from labour unions in the US for many years under the umbrella of the ITF. US
seamen were the highest paid in the world. Labour unions there wanted to preserve
their power and wealth derived from dues and government subsidies and get back
jobs lost to ships under open registry. However, in 1962, when US labour Unions
took a case to the US Supreme Court to have US labour law extended to US owned
ships, the British Government representative, in order to protect US owned vessels
operating under the British flag from US taxation, declared the position of US labour
unions harmful to trade. (Carlisle, 1981, p. 166)

Following anti-Panamanian picketing in Boston, the Panamanian Government
launched a diplomatic protest against “unfriendly acts” with the “purpose of depriving
the Republic of Panama of its sovereign right to register ships”. In Panama’s view,
the picketing was illegal because ships crews were not involved.

Although US

Government supported open registries, providing legal support to Panama and
Liberia in several instances, it had difficulties in responding to Panama’s protest.
The US had its own internal conflict in deciding whether strategic convenience or
labour in support of “the American way of life” should be given precedence.
5

According to Carlisle (1981, p. 136 ), the term PanLibHon was developed for easy reference to the
Panamanian, Liberian and Honduran open registries.
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Some ships were transferred to mask clandestine activities ranging from smuggling,
sub-standard operations and illegally transported war material. 6 There was also
corruption by consuls administering the Panamanian registry system. The
Panamanian unmatched tax advantage already ran counter to the political and
economic interests of European states. With the charges of corruption and shady
operations, an International Labour Organization (ILO) Committee, consisting
entirely of Europeans, conducted a European initiated investigation of the
Panamanian registry and delivered a resounding condemnation, crafted in
diplomatic language, despite written recognition that Panama was taking positive
steps to enhance its registry administration. (Carlisle, 1981, pp. 140-141).

The

report was a major propaganda victory that gave that registry a bad image. (Carlisle,
1981, pp. 49-58). The calls for investigations of the Panama registry were made
because “[o]pponents and critics of the system hoped to utilize the method of
investigation as a weapon of attack, exposing what they perceived as deceptions
and evasion of law.”

Increasingly, “the issue was seen as one of power and

economics, not of ethics”. (Carlisle, 1981, pp. 134-135).

Despite its excellent start in the early 1950s, there were major vessel accidents
during the 1960s and 1970s involving Liberian registered vessels.7 These accidents
reinforced views, particularly within TMS, that open registry states were only
interested in economic gain at the expense of vessel and personnel safety and
environmental protection.

2.2.4

The Internationalization of Shipping

In the 18th century small shipowners focused on prevention from trading, protection
from piracy and protectionism under the aegis of powerful national states. In the
20th century, particularly the latter half, labour cost differentials, varying national

6

Greek shipowners sought refuge under British registry from labour and security laws before
transferring to the Panamanian flag. An August 1938 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence report showed
that during the Spanish Civil War, of 161 vessels involved in clandestine operations only 11 were
Panamanian flagged. The others were European flagged. (See Carlisle, 1981, p. 62).
7
The Torrey Canyon wrecked in 1967 off Britain’s Cornish coast; the Ocean Eagle broke in two off
San Juan, Puerto Rico in 1968; and the Argo Merchant grounded off Nantucket, in the winter of 1976.
(See Carlisle, 1981, pp. 175-183).
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taxation structures, credit availability, foreign currency exchange control and
avoidance of strict regulatory control became the foremost considerations of
shipowners as shipping and maritime services became more internationalized.
There has been a loosening of the traditional relation between the national economy
and the shipping industry resulting in the creation of new types of shipping
operations that are dependent on employment of factors of production on a global
basis.

This internationalization of shipping firms has taken place within an

environment of direct and indirect subsidies and other state support for tonnage
registered under the national flag of TMS. (Metaxas, 1985, pp. 2-3).

2.3

The Interests and Activities of Aspiring Maritime States

Since the end of WWII, there has been considerable decolonisation, in keeping with
the recognition for self-determination of peoples, giving rise to many new politically
independent states. Though politically independent, these new states are generally
underdeveloped, economically weak and under pressure due to limited financial and
other resources. Some are micro-states, “`exceptionally small in area, population
and human and economic resources´”. (Starke, 1989, p. 97). As they are former
colonies, they have no international maritime tradition. Inspired by the successes of
Panama and Liberia, and seeking avenues to meet legitimate aspirations for socioeconomic development, many have decided to exercise their rights to participate in
maritime activities and have become flag states under the existing international legal
regime.

In this dissertation, the term AMS is used mainly to describe these

emerging maritime countries. 8

Within the last 25 years, many AMS have entered the maritime services sector.
Some have moved into ship registration and have become flag states taking on
responsibilities for worldwide monitoring and control of ships while others have
entered into related activities such as marine insurance and ship financing.
(Mukherjee, 2000a, p. 3). For many of these AMS, the sea, its resources and the

8
AMS include semi-autonomous overseas territories (OTs) of TMS which have responsibility for
their fiscal affairs and which engage in ship registration and other maritime services. It should
perhaps be noted that in the case of the United Kingdom, the constitutional position is that most of
these territories are colonies.
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maritime services support sector are some of the few remaining avenues for their
development.

But delivery of maritime services by AMS means breaking into

markets that for centuries were dominated by TMS, providing them with a significant
source of wealth. These developments signal increased competition and conflict of
interests.

2.4

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is clear that maritime interests can be divided into two
categories: public interests of state with political, economic, social and
military/strategic objectives; and private interests with commercial profit-making
objectives. Interests are essentially the same everywhere and remain constant with
the passage of time, seeking to enhance well-being through accumulation of wealth,
whether private or public. This latter characteristic has caused and will continue to
cause conflicts within and among states and other parties involved in maritime
activities. Finally, parties with maritime interests are prepared to forge alliances, as
they find it convenient, to achieve the objects of their interests.

Considering the new internationalized environment in which shipping operates, the
nature of maritime interests, the entry of AMS into maritime activities despite their
limited resources and the adverse image of open registries, several questions arise.
What are the duties and responsibilities of maritime states? With ship registry now
dominated by non-traditional maritime nations, led by Panama and Liberia, what will
be the fate of the associated services that revolve around maritime transport? What
conflicting interests are caused by this prospective question? Who are the parties
with conflicting interests and in what ways do their interests conflict? How are these
conflicts of interests being manifested and how are they likely to be manifested in
the future? What are the pressures and constraints facing AMS? How are the
conflicts of interests and pressures impacting or likely to impact on maritime
administrations in AMS? These are addressed in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
3.0 The Rights and Responsibilities of Maritime States
Maritime affairs govern the specialised activities related to maritime transport and
international seaboard trade. The rights and responsibilities of states with interests
in maritime affairs are embodied in a regime of international law with the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) providing the umbrella
framework.

It affirms the right of states to participate in maritime affairs and

balances those rights with concomitant duties and responsibilities for maritime
safety and environmental protection. The provisions of UNCLOS are elaborated in
other conventions made by “competent international organizations” namely, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) on technical conventions dealing with
design, construction, manning, equipment and operation of ships; and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) on the working and living conditions, social
security and other standards for seafarers.

Conventions on economic and on

private law aspects of shipping have been developed by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and Comité Maritime
International (CMI) respectively.9 (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific [ESCAP], 1991, pp. 2-3).
3.1

Material Sources of International Law

‘Law-making’ treaties 10 and custom are the main sources of international law
although other sources include decisions of judicial or arbitral tribunals, juristic work
9

UNCTAD and ESCAP are no longer law making bodies and therefore they do not make conventions
anymore.
10
Treaty is the general name (nomen generalissum) used in international law to signify binding
agreements among states. (Starke, 1989, pp. 436, 437). `Law-making´ treaties differ from `treaty
contracts´, the latter being between two or a few states. They therefore cannot be considered to be
sources of international law as they do not have universal acceptance. Also not all `law-making´
treaties contain rules of universal application. (Starke, 1989, pp. 42-43).
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and decisions or determinations of the organs of international institutions. In recent
times ‘law-making’ treaties, such as conventions, which lay down rules of universal
or general application, have replaced custom as the main source of international law.
(Starke, 1989, pp. 35-46). Customary international law is derived from maritime
practices that are so generally and universally accepted over time that they are
considered to be legally binding on all States and on their nationals. (Mukherjee,
2002, p. 5). The decisions of organs of international institutions as a source of
international law are becoming increasingly important. (Starke, 1989, p. 32,53).

3.2

The Nature of International Law

International law has public and private components. Public international law, which
in the majority, consists of the principles and rules of conduct which states feel
bound to observe, and do commonly observe, in their relations with each other. It
also includes the rules of law relating to the functioning of international institutions or
organizations, their relations with each other, and their relations with states and
individuals. (Starke, 1989, p. 3).
Conventions are binding multilateral treaties among states.

A state which has

become party to a convention will be bound to implement that convention by
performing it in good faith when it enters into force. Özçaryir (2001, pp. 54-55)
points out that treaty obligations are given priority over domestic law so that internal
laws may not be used as justification for failure to perform a treaty. A treaty that is
in force, requires legislative and enforcement action by a state party to ensure that
its obligations are implemented within its jurisdiction. (ESCAP, 1991, pp. 6-7).

3.3

Sovereignty and Jurisdiction

Sovereignty is a fundamental territorial concept of statehood in which supreme
authority for law making and jurisdiction over persons and property in its territory is
vested in the state to the exclusion of other states. Sovereignty in the relations
between states signifies independence regarding the functions of a state. (Starke,
1989, pp.157-158). As international law is binding upon states, and the fact that in
most states treaty obligations are given priority over domestic law, the supreme
authority of states’ sovereignty is modified by treaties to which states have become
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parties and by customary international law which is binding on all states. Compared
with the 18th century when highly nationalised states had few limitations on their
powers under international law, today, “the sovereignty of a state means the
residuum of power which is possessed within the confines laid down in international
law”. (Starke, 1989, p. 100).

According to Özçayir (2001, pp. 61-62) the jurisdiction of a state is an attribute of its
sovereignty which is based on five generally accepted principles, namely:
(i)

The territorial principle under which a state has jurisdiction over crimes
committed in its territory;

(ii)

The nationality principle under which the state can punish its nationals for
offences on the sole basis of their nationality;

(iii)

The protective principle11 by which states may take action in respect of
offences committed outside its territory which are prejudicial to its
security, integrity or vital economic interest. (There is uncertainty as to
how far this principle extends in practice and it is possible that some
States may abuse this principle by giving it very broad interpretations.);

(iv)

The passive personality principle where a state may claim jurisdiction to
adjudicate in a matter on the basis of the nationality of the actual or
potential victims; and,

(v)

The universal principle which empowers states to try crimes of a
particular nature, for example piracy, regardless of the nationality of the
offender or the place where it was committed.

3.4

Implementation of Conventions

Implementation of conventions, by means of legislative or executive action, to
ensure their performance “in good faith”, is an obligatory responsibility of states that
are party to them.12 This requires the dual actions of passage of legislation and of
enforcement by the state party, to ensure that its obligations are implemented by
ships, shipping companies, individuals and foreign ships within its jurisdiction.
11

Kasoulides (1998, p. 32) uses the term ``objective territorial principle´´.
Conventions can become binding on a state by several means, namely: signature without reservation
as to acceptance; signature followed by ratification, acceptance or approval; and accession. See
Starkes, (1989, pp. 451-453) and Article 14 of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, 1969.

12
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International maritime law cannot meet its objectives of regulating the maritime
activities, if legislation and or enforcement are inadequate.

Legislation must

properly reflect convention provisions; provide the requisite legal and administrative
framework to enable effective discharge of state responsibilities; provide effective
sanction against breaches; and provide for control mechanisms such as survey,
inspection and certification of ships to ensure compliance with technical standards.
Survey and certification functions are usually implemented through a specialised
agency of government or inspectorate of shipping although most states nowadays
delegate these functions, to a greater or lesser degree, to classification societies.
(ESCAP, 1991, pp. 12-13).

3.5

The Maritime Administration

The Maritime Administration is the entity tasked by the government to oversee
maritime activities in keeping with national interests and the process of
implementation.

A Maritime Administration therefore must be structured to

effectively discharge the obligations of the state enshrined in its national laws and in
conventions to which the state is party; oversee the economic development aspects
of shipping; implement technical requirements for safety and environmental
protection relating to design, construction, equipment, survey, inspection, operation,
manning, and certification of ships and personnel; and, working, living, social and
other conditions in relations to seafarers. These interests may vary depending on
whether the state is a flag state, coastal state, or a port state. 13

13

In the context of the IMO, “Administration means the Government of the state whose flag the vessel
is entitled to fly”. See for example SOLAS chapter 1 regulation 2. Visiting lecturers and Professors of
the World Maritime University describe the Maritime Administration differently. Plant (1998, pp.15) describes the Maritime Administration as an integral and specialised part of a state’s public
administration that is tasked to develop coherent maritime policy; formulate objectives, goals, and
work plans; and oversee decision making, and control. According to Vanchiswar (1996, p. ix)
maritime administration entails exercise of “management with authority” for satisfactory and efficient
undertaking of those functions embodied within the country’s maritime laws and international
conventions to which it is party. Chowdhury (2001, p. 1), states “maritime administration” includes
oversight of the economic and developmental aspects of shipping and maritime activities including
safety of life, property and the marine environment.
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3.6

The Rights and Responsibilities Flag States

3.6.1

Nationality and Flag

Article 91 of UNCLOS outlines the prerogative rights and duties of states with
regards to nationality and flags of ships. It provides:
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its
flag. Ships shall have the nationality of the State whose flag they are
entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the
ship.
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly
its flag documents to that effect.

It is necessary to address the question of jurisdiction over ships because the high
seas are not under the jurisdiction of any state.

This principle is enshrined in

international law. Article 92 of UNCLOS outlines that “Ships shall sail under the flag
of one State only …”. Based on the territorial principle of jurisdiction, every state
has jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag on the high seas.

Mukherjee (2000a, pp.

4-5) explains that “without nationality, a ship as a self-contained communal unit,
where people live, work and interact, would, metaphorically speaking, float into a
legal vacuum”.

Therefore, the jurisdiction of the flag state applies under the

“`extension of territory´” otherwise known as the “`floating island doctrine´” which
has been confirmed in a number of cases. 14 Affirming these rights, Article 97 of
UNCLOS provides that only the flag state has penal jurisdiction in matters of
collision or any incident of navigation on the high seas. Any state which has clear
grounds to believe that proper control and jurisdiction is not being exercised may
report to the flag state which must then investigate the matter and take the
necessary remedial action. The flag state must ensure that there is an inquiry into
all accidents on the high seas including those involving nationals from other states.

14

In the LOTUS case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held that “... a ship on the
high seas is assimilated to the territory of the state the flag of which it flies, for just as in its own
territory, that state exercises its authority upon it, and no other state may do so. “ See (1927), PCIJ.
Series A, No. 10, p.25.
Byles, J. referred to “...a ship on the high seas. .. as part of the territory of that nation whose flag she
carries; and all persons on board her are to be considered as subject to the jurisdiction of the laws of
that nation, as much so as if they had been on land within that territory. See Regina v. Anderson,
(1868), II Cox Crim. Cas. 198.
Christiancy J. referred to vessels on the high seas as “elongations of the territory of the nation under
whose flag they sail.“ See People v. Taylor (1859), 7 Mich. 160.
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By granting a ship the right to fly its flag, a state signals its intent, in keeping with
UNCLOS Article 94 to effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over the ship; maintain a register of
ships; assume jurisdiction under its internal law over the ship, its master, officers
and crew; ensure safety at sea, with regards to construction, equipment and
seaworthiness, manning and labour conditions; and ensure training of the crew in
accordance with applicable instruments including the use of signals, communication
and prevention of collision.

Consistent with the right of a state to determine the conditions for grant of its
nationality, Ready (1998, p. 4) points out that a vessel may possess the nationality
of a state if the criteria for nationality is based on nationality of the shipowner. In this
instance, the vessel does not need to carry documents evidencing nationality nor fly
the flag of the state. The UK Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 before its amendment
in 1988 made such provision. Following the 1988 amendments, British character is
conveyed by registration only.

3.6.2

Registration of Ships and Mortgages

In contrast with nationality which is a substantive notion in international law,
registration is the procedural device through which nationality is conferred on a ship.
It is therefore prima facie evidence of a ship’s nationality. (Mukherjee, 2000a, p. 6).
In other words, registration is the administrative act by which nationality and the
collateral rights and duties are conferred on ships which have fulfilled the criteria set
by the state.

Through registration, ships are brought under the jurisdictional

authority of the state with obligations to implement the requirements of state laws.
Correspondingly, the state undertakes national and international responsibilities in
respect of that ship. (Özçayir, 2001, p. 11).
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Registration means “the entering of a matter into the public records”. (Ready, 1998,
pp. 6-7). It involves the execution of private and public law functions in respect of
ships.15 The public law function is concerned with administrative matters pertaining
to national interests comprising inter alia: conferment of rights to the ship to fly the
flag, to diplomatic protection, naval protection, consular services and engagement in
cabotage activities; and duties of the ship to conform to state regulations on matters
of safety, pollution control, manning and labour conditions and shipboard discipline.
The private law function concerns the protection of private proprietary interests in
ships such as providing prima facie evidence of title and ownership as well as
protection of interests and priority rankings of holders of security interests such
mortgages and hypotheques. (Mukherjee, 1993, p. 32).

While there is the requirement for flag states to operate a register of ships, there are
no international conventions in force which specify the form or operation of ship
registers. The type of registry operated depends on the interests of the state. From
states’ practices many categories of registries have evolved, namely: Traditional
(closed) registries; FOC, open or international registries; Secondary or offshore
registries; 16 and hybrid registries. (Mukherjee, 2000a, pp. 4-11)

Traditionally, closed registries have been operated primarily by TMS. The basic
premise is that flag state control, to ensure compliance with its laws and with
international conventions to which the state is party, will be better effected through
direct state influence over the shipowner/operator. There is therefore a relatively
rigid concept of genuine link 17 in the closed registry system. They allow for the
registration of ships owned by nationals of states, or companies with majority
ownership and control from within that state. 18 (Mukherjee, 2000a, pp. 7-8).
15

In ship registration, the public and private law functions have public policy. The public law
functions are concerned with national interests relating to the rights and protection of ships. The
private law functions affords the public access to information as to who has a propriety right to ships
which are entitled to the rights and privileges of the national flag. See Wood, V.C. in the case
Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner. (1860), 29 L.J. Ch. 827 at 830.
16
Li, K.X. & Wohan. (1999). New developments in ship registry. International Journal of Marine
and Coastal Law, 14, 137 uses the term `compromise registry´ instead of secondary registry.
17
Genuine link is a requirement under UNCLOS. This subject is treated in the following chapter.
18
Mukherjee (2000a, p. 7) outlines that there are different degrees of ``tightness´´ with closed
registries as criteria for determining nationality of individuals and companies vary among states.
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Open or international registry system is used by states which permit the registration
of ships in their jurisdiction, without any or all of the restrictions imposed by closed
registries.19

Several TMS have established secondary or offshore registries to counteract the
attraction of tonnage to open registries from their closed registries. As economic
incentive to shipowners, TMS permit hiring of foreign crews, under secondary
registries, at wages lower than those paid to domestic crews, to encourage
registration at home. Secondary registries purport to provide economic incentives
without sacrificing maritime safety. (Mukherjee, 2000a, pp. 8-9).

Hybrid registries appears to have come from the 1986 United Nations Convention
on Conditions for Registration of Ships, (UNCCROS),
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which attempted to

definitively articulate the meaning of genuine link and to address aspects of its
requirements.

UNCCROS does not prescribe any qualifications for vessel

ownership. It asserts that the conditions set in flag state laws be sufficient to permit
the exercise of effective jurisdiction and control over its ships. UNCCROS also
permits partial manning of ships by non-national, provided that their level of
competence and conditions of employment conform to applicable international rules
and standards. UNCCROS requires corporate shipowners to be established and
have their principal place of business in the territory of the flag state. Failing this,
there must be a representative or management person, natural or judicial, available
in the flag state, to meet all legal, financial and other obligations. Many so-called
FOCs operate hybrid registries, some of which have higher safety standards than
closed registries. (Mukherjee, 2000a, p. 9)

Bareboat charter-in registration of vessels, under conditions specified in UNCCROS,
provides for protection of seafarers and for development of national shipping
19

International registry is the preferred term today, as `flags of convenience´, and to a lesser extent,
`open registry´, have become stigmatised, being accused of promoting economic gain at the expense
of safety and environmental protection. The `open registry´ system will be discussed in chapter 4.
20
This convention, developed under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), is not yet in force. It requires ratification by 40 states which have at least
25% of the world fleet tonnage for entry into force.
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industries through promotion of joint ventures. It involves a temporary change of
flag for the duration of the charter with mortgages and hypotheques being registered
in the state of the shipowner (the flagging-out state or state of registry) and
registration for effective vessel control done in the state of the charterer (the
flagging-in state or flag state).

This form of `parallel registration´ or `dual

registration´ essentially separates the private and public law functions of registration
between the flagging-out state and the flagging-in state respectively. The owner
earns revenue without having to operate a ship and the charterer gains use of a ship
without having to purchase one. The flagging-in state enjoys economic gains from
more tonnage added to its fleet, and possibly increased employment of its seafarers.
(Mukherjee, 1993, p. 35).

3.6.3

Surveys, Inspections and Certification of Ships

Technical matters governing safety and environmental protection are mainly
elaborated in IMO conventions, codes, resolutions and protocols.

These

instruments outline uniform minimum standards for design, construction, equipment
and operation of ships. States are responsible for ensuring compliance by ships
flying their flag, through surveys, inspections and by issuing certificate as evidence
of such compliance. The principal instruments concerning design, construction and
equipment are the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as
amended, (SOLAS), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, 1973/78, as amended, (MARPOL) and the International Conventions on
Load Lines, 1966, as amended (Load Lines 66). Operational standards are set out
in SOLAS Chapter IX, titled “Management for the safe operation of ships” and the
related International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for
Pollution Prevention (ISM Code).

The International Convention on Tonnage

Measurement of Ships, 1969, (Tonnage 69) is significant as tonnage is a criterion
used to determine applicability of conventions.

These instruments provide that flag state Administrations may entrust surveys,
inspections and certification to recognized organizations or surveyors. However,
they typically provide, as in SOLAS, Chapter 1, Regulation 6, that “in every case, the
Administration shall fully guarantee the completeness and efficiency of the
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inspection and survey, and shall undertake to ensure the necessary arrangements
to satisfy this obligation.”

Guidelines for such delegation are provided in IMO

Resolutions A.739(18) and A.789(19). They outline competencies for recognized
organizations (ROs) in areas of personnel training, management, technical
appraisals and survey inspection and certification of ships. All delegations should
be according to legally binding written agreement and based the laws of the flag
state.

These agreements should be supported by robust administrative and

management system internal to the Administration to enable proper monitoring and
control of recognized organizations.

3.6.4

Rights and Responsibilities in Relation to Seafarers

In exercise of flag state rights relating to seafarers there are three main socioeconomic considerations. The first is the practice whereby a state with a sizeable
merchant fleet only permits manning of its vessels by its nationals in order to
maximise employment and economic contribution. The second instance is where a
state in which crewing costs are high permits employment of non-nationals aboard
its ships in the interest of shipowners and the economic benefits to the state from
shipowners’ contributions.

Third is the practice of states with large seafaring

populations and small merchant fleets of seeking socio-economic benefits through
employment of seafarers. “ … [T]his state of affairs, if left unbridled, may lead to
economic and labour exploitation and unsafe practices.” International legislation on
manning, certification, engagement and welfare of seafarers aim “to regulate
potential ills and bring about uniformity in national regimes.” (Mukherjee, 2002, pp.
183-184).

As part of the wider objective of safety at sea, Article 94 of UNCLOS imposes an
obligation on flag states to ensure that ships flying their flag are manned by
competent crews.

The master and officers are to “possess appropriate

qualifications” in maritime disciplines and the crew of each ship is to be “appropriate
in number and qualifications”. They are to be “fully conversant with and required to
observe the applicable international regulations concerning … ” safety, collision
prevention, pollution prevention and management and radio communications.
Details pertaining to wages, hours of work, manning, social and living conditions are
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elaborated in several ILO Conventions, in particular No. 109.

The International

Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping of Seafarers,
1978, as amended in 1995 and 1997 (STCW), sets out the training, qualification and
levels of competence for seafarers.

UNCLOS, Article 94 also outlines mandatory requirements for the flag state over
ships flying its flag.

Paragraph 1 requires the state to “effectively exercise its

jurisdiction and control in … social matters” while Paragraph 3 requires it to take
“measures … necessary to ensure safety at sea with regards, inter alia, to: … labour
conditions”.

The labour and social conditions are primarily addressed in ILO

instruments which flag states are required to implement. They set out minimum
employment age; wages, manner of payment, work hours, settlement in the event of
work termination and legal recourse for disputes; annual vacation and public holiday
entitlements; hours of rest; disposal of property of diseased seamen; occupational
safety; health and welfare onboard ship including provision of proper food, water,
medical treatment and accommodation; powers of master in matters of criminal
offences, discipline, welfare, requisition of provisions and settlement of labour
disputes; and, relief and repatriation of seamen and protection from abandonment.
(Mukherjee, 2002, pp. 185-186).

3.7

Rights and Responsibilities of Coastal States

A coastal state is any state that is bordered by the sea. UNCLOS provides for the
establishment of maritime zones in which coastal states have varying rights and are
empowered to exercise varying degrees of jurisdiction.

Again, these rights are

balanced by responsibilities. The definitions given below are based on UNCLOS.

3.7.1

Internal Waters

The coastal state has full sovereignty over internal waters which includes all waters
to the landward side of the baseline from which the breadth of its territorial sea is
measured. In internal waters territorial jurisdiction of the state applies regarding law
making and enforcement. The state has absolute discretion as to whether or not to
admit vessels into its internal waters and the conditions governing such access,
subject to the rules of sovereign and diplomatic immunity.
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Only in two

circumstances is the power of the coastal state modified in internal waters. The first
is when the state is obliged by treaty of custom to allow entry of its vessels into its
internal waters.

The second is where a straight baseline established is in

accordance with Article 8(2) of UNCLOS. In the latter case, the coastal state is
obliged to allow innocent passage of foreign ships. (Özçayir, 2001, pp. 68-69)

3.7.2

Territorial Sea and Archipelagic Waters

Compared to internal waters, state sovereignty is modified in the territorial seas and
in archipelagic waters pursuant to Articles 2 and 49 of UNCLOS respectively. The
state has sovereignty over these zones but is subject to foreign vessels’ right of
innocent passage. Ships must comply with the laws established by the coastal state
which may take punitive action against ships for any activities in these zones that
are prejudicial or harmful to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.

3.7.3

Contiguous Zone

The contiguous zone, according to the meaning given in article 33(1) of UNCLOS,
describes the waters, having a breadth of 12 nautical miles, that are immediately
adjacent to and seawards of the territorial sea. Within its contiguous zone, the
coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary legislation within its territory or territorial sea.
Control is only exercisable in respect of ships entering the contiguous zone.
(Özcayir, 2001, pp. 71-72)

3.7.4

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

The EEZ, a new maritime zone instituted under UNCLOS, may be claimed at the
discretion of the coastal state. A state which claims an EEZ has sovereign rights to
explore and exploit the living and non-living resources.

It also has binding

obligations to conserve and manage these resources and to protect the marine
environment. The coastal state has legislative jurisdiction over the EEZ but must
respect freedom of navigation in respect of foreign ships. As part of its protective
role, the coastal state may take measures to prevent or mitigate the threat of
pollution from ships.

The pollution prevention function is also exercisable in
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accordance with the International Convention relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969.

3.7.5

High seas

The high seas is that part of the sea defined in UNCLOS Article 86 as ”… not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or the internal waters
of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.” According to
Özçayir (2001, p. 73) the high seas are “res communis” where all states may
exercise freedom with regards to navigation, fishing, laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, overflight and the conduct scientific research.

However, coastal states

may intervene on the high seas to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent
danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution
resulting from marine accident. They may also act under the universal jurisdictional
principle to seize and punish vessels involved in slave trading and piracy.

3.8

Rights and Responsibilities of Port States

It is well accepted that port and harbour works are contained in internal waters
which are assimilated to territory bringing the exercise of rights and responsibilities
within the ambit of full territorial sovereignty. It is therefore within the prerogative of
the port state to decide on the conditions for access into its ports. However, due to
accident, stress of weather or force majeure, ships may be forced to enter port to
seek refuge. Under these circumstances, the ship operators are not punishable for
any violations committed unintentionally.

The port state is therefore a state in

whose port a foreign ship has entered voluntarily and is present for the time being.

UNCLOS Part XII, which expanded the powers of port states in the context of
protection and preservation of the marine environment, provides that states may
establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels
into its their ports or internal waters. The port state may institute court proceedings
against vessels voluntarily within its port for pollution damage in any maritime zone
falling under its jurisdiction and on the high seas. Within the last 30 years new
powers have been ascribed to port states under several IMO and ILO instruments,
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for example, under SOLAS, MARPOL, LL66, Tonnage 69, STCW and ILO 147 to
prevent the operation of sub-standard ships.

Complementary to flag state

responsibilities, these conventions allow for limited enforcement of standards in
respect of foreign ships. They empower officers of port states to inspect statutory
certificates issued under the authority of the flag state.

Where there are clear

grounds to believe that the ship does not correspond substantially with the
particulars of the certificate, the ship may be inspected and if necessary, detained
until the particular deficiency is rectified. Guidelines for port state inspections are
laid down in IMO Resolutions A.787(19) and A.882(21).

3.9

The Safety Net

The responsibilities of states, if properly executed, amount to the creation of a safety
net to prevent substandard ships from trading and presenting risks to the crew, the
marine environment and to other ships. Özçayir (2001, p. 93), identifies six main
elements of the safety net:
(i)

International conventions of the IMO

(ii)

The conventions of the ILO

(iii)

Flag State control

(iv)

Classification societies

(v)

The marine insurance industry; and

(vi)

Port State control

The primary and inescapable responsibility rests with the flag states. They are to
ensure that vessels flying their flag adher to the standards set in international
instruments. Where responsibilities are delegated to classification societies, flag
states are to monitor their performance to ensure they meet the required standards.
Owners are responsible to the flag state for the condition of their vessels, while
insurance companies are to require that only vessels meeting the prescribed stands
are insured. Port state control provides a monitoring role in support of flag states
and in protection of their interests. Unfortunately, as Özçayir (2001, pp. 94-95)
observes, the net is sometimes breached due to callous actions on the part of some
parties and this resulted in disastrous human, environmental and economic
consequences.
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Chapter 4
4.0 The Nature of Competing Interests in Maritime Administration
This chapter further examines the nature of maritime interests, identifies the
competing interests and resultant conflicts and their impact on Maritime
Administrations from the perspective of aspiring maritime states (AMS), acting in
their primary capacity as flag states. To properly engage in this debate, a fuller
understanding of the nature and pursuit of interests, the interests in conflict, strategy
and strategic alliances, war and politics is necessary.

4.1

The Nature and Pursuit Interests

4.1.1

National Interests

According to Reynolds (2000, p. 15):
The term `national interest´ has traditionally been used as a `rationale for
State action´. Broadly speaking, a national interest is a stake or issue,
usually political, legal, economic or military, which has a major impact on
the well being of the State and its nationals. National interests then, are
the basis on which a State establishes its national objectives. They
determine the manner in which a state administers its maritime affairs
and its subsequent conduct and functioning in the international arena.

Defending his foreign policy in pursuit of national interests, Lord Palmerston (1989,
p.10) in an address to the British House of Commons in 1848 stated: "We have no
eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and
perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." In pursuit of their national
interests, states will cross lines of friendship and enmity to forge strategic alliances.
It is also a well known policy, perhaps best espoused by the US, that states will go
to war to defend what they consider to be vital national interests.
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4.1.2

Strategy and Strategic Alliances

Strategic planning involves the establishment of long-term objectives and the
employment of measures necessary, on account of the forecasted environmental
changes, to ensure that the objectives are achieved. (Dixon, 2001, p.19). National
interests form the basis on which a state develops its policies. Policies in turn lead
to the development of objectives. Strategies are the courses of action, tailored to
the prevailing environment, that are employed to achieve those objectives. Like
states, non-state maritime actors, with private economic and commercial interests,
will develop policies, objectives and strategies based on their interests and the
prevailing environment. As maritime trade is global, strategic alliances and conflicts
can occur between non-state actors of varying nationalities, as occurred during the
early years of open registries.

4.1.3

Interests in Conflict

As shown in chapter 2, external situations which are in conflict or inconsistent with a
state’s national interests could arise in the conduct of maritime affairs. “Conflict of
interest” is “the state of incompatibility of goals of two or more actors” and the
degree of conflict of interest in a situation affects the behaviour of the actors and
therefore affects the outcome of the strategic interaction. (Axelrod, 1970, p. 5).
Total conflict of interest, leading to a “zero sum game”, exists when in an interaction
one party must win and the other must lose. Alternatively, there is the “partnership
game” involving no conflict of interest where parties cooperate and attain their
preferred objectives. The outcome of any strategic interaction is affected by: the
“possibility of communication” among the actors including whether they are able to
make binding commitments, or whether their pledges can be broken with little or no
consequences; the “complexity of the situation” that may make cooperation difficult
even if objectives are compatible; and the “relevance of the interaction” that
determines its perceived importance and how vigorously it is pursued. (Axelrod,
1970, p. 7). For the purposes of this dissertation, “conflict of interest” and interests
in conflict are synonymous and exist where the national interests of a state conflict
with the interests of other maritime actors. 21
21

Although Axelrod uses the term “conflict of interest”, the heading “Interests in Conflict” has been
selected to avoid confusion with the common usage and understanding of the term conflict of interest.
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4.1.4

War

Clausewitz, the noted nineteenth century theorist, points out that “war is not just a
political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce … by
other means” aimed at fulfilling policy objectives in pursuit of an interest(s). (1982,
p.119). He described its characteristics as follows:
•

War is the continuation of state policies by other means.

•

The object of war is to compel the opponent to submit to ones will.

•

To defeat an enemy and have him submit to the desired point of view, it is
necessary to overcome the combined resistance of his means and his will.

•

The more powerful the motives of a war, the more it affects the people i.e.
the greater the interests at stake the more widespread and intense the
conflicts will be.

•

War is peculiar to other conflicts in only one respect; it employs the use of
arms and violence as the means to achieving political objectives. (1982, p.
101-122).

4.1.5

Politics

Politics involve the struggle for promotion and acceptance of the ideas/policies of
one party (state or non-state) over another’s.

“Political power … [is] drawn

alternatively or in combination from the strength of leaders and institutions, the will
of the people and/or the support the nation state could win from other nation states.”
(Rothkopf, 1998, p. 325).

4.1.6

Similarities Between Conflict of National Interests and War

From the foregoing, it can be seen that conflicts of interests of two states vis a vis
each other and war, which is armed conflict, bear great similarities. They both
involve strategic interactions and a state of incompatible goals.

Their intensity

affects the behaviour of the parties involved and the outcome of interactions. In the
extreme, conflict of interests and war involve one party winning and the other losing.
Alternatively, the parties may cooperate to achieve their desired goals. Interactions,
especially negotiations, depend on the parties being able to speak to each other and
whether agreements are binding or can be easily broken.

Cooperation is made

more difficult by complexities and the vigour with which conflict of interest and war
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are pursued is dependent on the importance of the interest at stake. The only
significant variation between conflict of interest and war is that war uses arms and
violence to achieve desired goals.

4.1.7

War Redefined

During the colonial era, TMS used war to secure and defend their maritime interests
which were both political and economic in nature. By becoming members of the
United Nations (UN) through acceptance of its Charter22, states have agreed to bind
themselves to resolving their conflicts by means other than war. (United Nations,
1998, pp. 3-5). For the most part this has been the case. The longest, most intense
and widespread conflict of the 20th century, the Cold War, was political in nature,
employing the use of very little violence. There have been several “trade wars”,
economical in nature, not involving use of arms.

Global political decisions

underpinned by treaty obligations have forced changes in the conduct of war,
modifying its characteristics so that the absence of violence does not necessarily
mean a cessation of war.

War today may be political, trade, or otherwise related, the defining character being
the intensity of the conflict or dispute.

Intensity in turn is determined by the

importance of the interest at stake. As maritime activities are both political and
economic with vast amounts of money at stake, they remain a flash point for war in
the modern day context. A state involved in an intensive maritime dispute may feel
so embattled that it considers itself to be at war. This would be the case if the
stronger party involved in a dispute employs measures aimed at compelling the
weaker party to submit to its will. A position adopted by one state may amount to a
declaration of war on the other.

Given the limited capacities of some maritime

states, war will also be defined relative to their means or lack of means.

22

The UN Charter is the treaty establishing that organization which is binding on states parties that
have ratified it. The states parties are therefore bound to perform its obligations in good faith.
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4.2

The Interests at Stake

The 1990 “British Shipping: Challenges and Opportunities Report” identified
economics and defence as the major maritime interests in TMS. It declared that the
shipping industry and its linkages with economic activities was a major determinant
of policy in Europe. Apart from direct industry earnings and employment benefits,
wider maritime interests – today styled `maritime clusters´ – include shipbroking,
marine insurance, ship financing, ship classification, shipbuilding and repairs,
equipment manufacture, port and harbour operations and offshore oil and gas
industry. Shipping provides skilled and experienced manpower that directly support
other maritime activities. The major concern was that the crewing of ships and
associated maritime activities may move to other countries with considerable
reduction in the likelihood of their return. According to Landon (2002, p. 12), the
United Kingdom (UK) Merseyside maritime cluster has nearly 600 companies
employing 6000 people with an annual turnover of £1.3 billion equivalent to US$2.0
billion. 23 Stares (2002, p. 5) expressed the view “`It is not just shipping but the
maritime cluster which creates employment´”. “`If you lose the fleet you will lose the
suppliers, the insurance´”. He estimates that the European Union (EU) maritime
clusters currently employ two (2) million people.

4.3

The Maritime Industry and the Power of States

Over the past 300 years the ability of nation states and their leaders to achieve their
aspirations and goals in international relations rested on three pillars: political power,
economic power and military power. (Rothkopf, 1998, p. 325). Like a stool on three
legs, if any of these pillars is weakened or removed there is corresponding structural
weakening or collapse in the power of the state. The military and economic pillars
are directly dependent on the maritime industry while political power affects those
pillars and are influenced by them.

The merchant navy has been the mainstay for logistic support during major war
efforts. This was demonstrated during WWI, WWII, the Falklands War and most
23

The 1990 British Shipping: Challenges and Opportunities Report (pp. 6-7) estimated foreign
exchange earnings in 1989 from the British shipping industry at £3.0 billion with net earnings of £1.1
billion while maritime related activities in London earned £1.22 billion.
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recently during the Gulf War. States through legislation such as section 902 of the
US Merchant Marine Act, 1936, are able to requisition ships flying their flag in times
of military necessity. There is the assumption, at least within the US, under its
policy of “effective control”, that states having US beneficially owned ships on their
registries will not object to their requisition. No agreements to this effect exists and
requisition does cover crewing of ships. (Schubert, 2002, p. 3).

Shipping, with its economies of scale, is the preferred mode of international trade. It
carries the vast majority of traded commodities.

It will continue to retain its

importance as world economies become more interdependent and trade increases.
It positively impacts balance of payments through employment for seafarers and
generation of foreign exchange through direct earnings and maritime related
industries.

It follows therefore that maritime activities are of great importance to politics as war
which the merchant marine directly supports is an instrument of politics, aimed at
achieving political objectives, and economics is a factor which strongly influences
the shaping of political objectives. Any factor which wrests control of ships and
seafaring activities from TMS, constitutes a direct threat to their power. Such is the
nature of open registries and associated maritime activities conducted by AMS.

4.4

Traditional Maritime States Verus Open Registry States

4.4.1

From Raleigh to Rochdale

The 1970 (Rochdale) Committee of Inquiry Into Shipping criticized FOCs for: taking
risks with sub-standard ships that resulted in a record of loss during the 1960’s that
was substantially higher than the world average; not having trade union protection
nor uniformed and guaranteed national standards for condition of service for
seafarers; harbouring conditions in which could lower global maritime safety
standards; and failing to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over their ships.
(Rochdale,1970, pp. 53-54).

Along with its criticisms, the Rochdale Report concluded that shipping from
developing countries, though a threat to British interests, was legitimate in its
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aspirations; the vast majority of ships under FOCs did not constitute sub-standard
shipping; although there was issuance of fraudulent certificates, FOCs attracted
British officers because the living, working standards were on balance equivalent to
European standards with better fringe benefits and security; and deterrents in TMS,
more than attractions by open registries, were the reasons for FOC ascendancy.
(Rochdale,1970, pp. 52-53). In short, there was the recognition that FOC registries
were exploiting legitimate competitive advantages. Why then the criticisms?

Control of the sea, trade and the riches of the world, as described by Raleigh,
brought great economic prosperity to Britain.

It embodied Britain’s legitimate

aspirations to become a wealthy and powerful nation at a period in history when it
was acceptable to use naval superiority to close off lines of communications and
distribution points, choking the vitality out of other states that competed for control of
riches and resources.

From 1812 to 1912, with industrial revolution and its population exploding from 12 to
41 million, Britain was unable to produce enough food to feed its population and raw
materials to supply its industries. The very existence of the British people, their
wealth, industries and economic life were entirely dependent on shipping which
ensured access to foreign markets and supplied seven eighth of their food and raw
materials. In that period, shipping quintupled reaching over 12 million tons and
nearly 21,000 ships, 4000 of which were ocean going. (Doughty, 1982, pp. 1-4).

Following WWI and WWII, British shipping laid in ruins with American shipping
gaining dominance over the war years. British efforts to rebuild its shipping industry
were frustrated by the advent of Panama and Liberia registries which had United
States support. Its efforts along with other European states to import genuine link
into the 1958 Treaty on the High Seas to allow them to determine whether they
recognize the nationality of ships was unsuccessful. Attempts to exclude Panama
and Liberia from the IMO Council had failed, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
ruling in favour of Panama and Liberia. London was the global centre of maritime
activities but Liberia’s fleet overtook the UK fleet in 1966 to become the largest in
the world. FOCs represented a credible threat to British shipping but the current
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code of conduct dictated peacetime behavior. Use of arms to settle conflicts over
maritime interests was now reprehensible in light of widespread acceptance of the
UN Charter. The Committee of Inquiry Into Shipping was launched. Critical of
FOCs, the Rochdale report identified their features to as follows:
(i)

The country of registry allows ownership and / or control of its
merchant vessels by non-citizens;

(ii)

Access to the registry is easy. A ship may usually be registered at a
consul’s office abroad. Equally important, transfer from the registry at
the owner’s option is not restricted;

(iii)

Taxes on the income from the ships are not levied locally and are
low. A registry fee and an annual fee, based on tonnage, are normally
the only charges made. A guarantee or acceptable understanding
regarding future freedom from taxation may also be given;

(iv)

The country of registry is a small power with no national
requirement under any foreseeable circumstances for all the shipping
registered, but receipt from very small charges on a large tonnage may
produce a substantial effect on its national income and balance of
payment;

(v)
(vi)

Manning by non-nationals is freely permitted;
The country of registry has neither the power nor the administrative
machinery effectively to impose any government or international
regulations; nor does it have the wish or the power to control the
companies themselves. (Rochdale,1970, p. 51).

While Raleigh, a Briton, underscored the legitimate aspirations of Britain, and any
other country, to become prosperous, the Rochdale Report appears to accept this
position, while at the same time importing a presumption that countries with FOC
registries are less entitled to pursue economic well being than Britain.

The

suggestion that the country of registry has no national requirement “under any
foreseeable circumstances” 24 for all the shipping registered is a refusal to accept
that these countries, like Britain, are entitled to became a great power over time. It
disassociated FOC states from the possibility of achieving sustainable development
based on maritime activities. It is perhaps the most damaging statement in the
Rochdale Report to the interests of FOC states because it branded their legitimate
aspirations illegitimate. Moreover, this illegitimacy which stigmatized the long term

24

Underlined for emphasis.
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developmental aspirations of the FOC state used as its basis for attack, the short
term and immediate positive financial benefits of ship registration: “receipt from very
small charges on a large tonnage may produce a substantial effect on its national
income and balance of payment.”

This sub-paragraph of the Rochdale Report

prosecuted and summarily convicted the legitimate aspirations of FOC states on a
trumped-up charge of illegitimacy, while it simultaneously garnered international
support for their public execution.

Failure to effectively enforce maritime laws in respect of vessels flying their flag was
the main argument against FOCs competitors. With centuries of British know-how,
experience and sufficiency of maritime resources these criticisms were valid. The
Report did not give any consideration to the possibility that performance of maritime
administration by FOCs may have been hampered by resource constraints. Instead,
it stigmatized FOCs by advancing the argument that they were unworthy
competitors.

An opponent, as shown earlier from Clausewitz, has a resistance

comprising both will and capacity. That “[t]he country of registry has neither the
power nor the administrative machinery effectively to impose any government or
international regulations; nor does it have the wish or the power to control the
companies themselves” makes it a competitor infra dig, unworthy of participating in
maritime affairs.

There was some justification in criticising registration at consuls’ offices.

That

system was plagued with corruption and could not have ensured completion of the
requisite pre-registration surveys. Through easy transfer in and out of registries,
operators of sub-standard ships could continue undetected and clandestine
activities could be easily masked. However, it would have been folly for FOCs to
overly restrict ease of transfers. Doing so would have created strictures similar to
those operating in TMS. Such restrictive conditions would have undermined the
advantage enjoyed by FOCs.

Practical difficulties could arise if the ship, for

example, required naval protection.

Many FOC states could not provide such

services. Therefore, provision for easy transfer along with an understanding of low
or no tax when the ship returns to the registry made good business sense. British
consuls also registered ships at their offices.
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The criticisms of FOCs raised in the Rochdale Report were not without justification.
An unfortunate series of underperformances by FOC states and the loss of two
Liberian tankers in the preceding decade, including Torrey Canyon which polluted
British shores, only served to strengthen its arguments. The bottom line however
was economics.

If shipowners did not have the FOC option “they might have

registered some of their tonnage under the UK flag, with the consequential benefit to
the employment opportunities open to UK seafarers and possibly to … [UK] balance
of payments.” (Rochdale, 1970, p. 52). The Rochdale Report came at the dawn of
the information age shortly after many British colonies which gained independence
became maritime competitors and many were to follow. It was a shot across the
bow of FOCs, a new kind of artillery in the arsenal of TMS, designed for an era of
redefined warfare.

It successfully stigmatised existing and potential FOCs and

would serve as a launching pad for future propaganda battles in the war to protect
the maritime interests of Great Britain with support from other TMS and nongovernmental organizations with like interests.

4.4.2

The ITF Lobby

The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) has been involved in anti-FOC
campaigns, representing the interests of seafarers since the 1940’s. Its message
surrounds the morality issue of preventing exploitation of seafarers from developing
countries – so-called `crews of convenience´ – who work in squalid conditions
aboard ships from neglectful FOC registries and are paid cheaply by shipowners.
ITF advocates employment based on union negotiated contracts to prevent
exploitation of seafarers.

Its record and reports can validly authenticate its

successes in unearthing corruption and fraudulent practices in some FOC
administrations and rescuing abandoned crews on `ships of shame´.

It has

championed the cause of the underdog seafarer, intervened where legal processes
are slow and successfully recouped millions of dollars in income and compensation
illegally withheld from seafarers, some of whom are deceased or disabled and their
families left to suffer untold hardship. (ITF, 2000b).

Kasoulides (1998, pp. 106-108) paints another picture. He shows that money rather
than morality has been the driving force behind ITF’s lobby with its campaign being
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orchestrated by western affiliates concerned with ensuring conditions of employment
suitable for their members. ITF’s campaign and boycotts since the 1970’s have
been directed almost exclusively at FOC ships including those which it
acknowledges that conditions aboard are among the best in the world. Meanwhile
vessels from other flags, known to be in worse conditions, are not targeted. The
National Union of Seafarers of India was suspended from ITF in 1978 and unions
from Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Phillipines, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea
suffered similar exclusion.

These unions saw lower wages as providing a

competitive advantage for their members and a means of sustaining foreign
exchange earnings. ITF, on the other hand, wants standardized wages worldwide, a
situation that would whittle away the advantages of seafarers from developing
countries.

Vivekanand (2001, p. 96) considers the argument of low wages to be a big lie. He
points out that a master from Japan or Europe, whose annual income of $64,000.00
is a middle income earner, but is barely able to save five to ten percent of his
earnings. In contrast, a master from India, paid $35,000,00, “lives like a king” and is
able to save up to sixty percent of his income. He argues that the better standard of
living, despite lower wages in absolute terms, will attract better talent to seafaring in
India than in the west. It is noteworthy that the number of seafarers from Europe,
USA and Japan continues to decline despite higher wages enjoyed by them.

The arguments put forward by Kasoulides and Vivekanand suggest that although
the labour lobby appears to show great success in protecting seafarers from
developing states, it has been manipulated by western factions within ITF to cause
distraction, by emphasizing the negative aspects of FOC registries. This tactic has
been employed to mask their real objective of strategically disrupting mechanisms
for fair trade to prevent developing countries from realizing and sustaining the
benefits of competitive advantages associated with low labour costs.

ITF’s

designation of FOCs based on nationality of beneficial ownership rather than
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effective jurisdictional control, clearly supports the intent to ensure that economic
benefits from shipping accrue to TMS and western affiliates.25

4.4.3

The Confusion Surrounding Genuine Link

The concept of genuine link as it relates to the nationality of ships and the reciprocal
rights and duties of shipowners and flag states was first introduced into international
maritime law through the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (GCOHS).

It

stemmed from a ruling in the Nottebohm case adjudicated by the ICJ, to determine
whether Liechtenstein could exercise diplomatic protection for Mr Nottebohm vis à
vis Guatemala.

Guatemala had expropriated the property of Mr Nottebohm,

formerly a German, who had acquired Liechtenstein nationality just before the out
break of WWII. Nationality, the ICJ concluded, “… is a legal bond having as its
basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interest and
sentiments together with the existence of reciprocal rights and responsibilities”. The
ICJ ruled in favour of Guatemala concluding that there was the absence of a
genuine connection between Mr Nottebohm and Liechtenstein. “Nottebohm had
adopted Liechtenstein nationality simply to `substitute for his status as a national of
a belligerent State that of a neutral State´”. (Ready, 1998, p. 11). Carlisle (1981, p.
154) regards the ruling as being against “`citizenship of convenience´”.

In 1956-58 Dutch and British lawyers sought to extend genuine link to ships even
though social attachment as described in the Nottebohm case was not applicable to
ships. This move was in response to labour interests that were opposed to FOCs.
“By establishing the principle of genuine link the haemorrhage of tonnage to the
open registries could be stemmed.”

(Ready, 1998, p. 11).

TMS also wanted

genuine link between the state and the ship enshrined in international law “`for
purposes of recognition of the national character of a ship by other states´”. (Carlisle,
1981, p.155). The aim here was to overturn nationality of ships based on the notion
of the flag state which was already established in international law. If nationality
25

OECD (2001, p. 57) gives costs of selected ships in 2000 as: 140,000 dwt Suezmax US$51m;
155,000 dwt Capesize bulk carrier US$38m; and a 3,500 TEU container vessel US$41m. World bank
(2000) gives the GDP of some AMS as follows: Sao Tome Principe US$46m; Marshall Islands
US$96m; Tonga US$153m; Vanuatu US$212m; St. Vincent and the Grenadines US$333m.
Ownership of such vessel by nationals of these AMS is unrealistic.

40

could be redefined based on beneficial ownership, Panama and Liberia, with the
third and eight largest tonnage would diminish in significance and would not be
entitled to seats on the IMO Council.

In a study undertaken for the ITF, in year 2000, Churchill sought to establish the
meaning of genuine link requirements in relation to the nationality of ships. He
utilized all of the tools available for treaty interpretation including: Travaux
préparatoires to appreciate the intent of the drafters of GCOHS, UNCLOS and
UNCCROS in which there is the genuine link requirement; the “object and purpose”
of those conventions regarding genuine link; the “subsequent practice” of parties to
GCOHS and UNCLOS to determine whether there is a common understanding of
genuine link; the decision of courts to determine if there is uniformity of interpretation;
and, the views expressed in the writings of scholars.

He found that although GCOHS and UNCLOS provide for the mandatory existence
of a genuine link between the flag state and ships having its nationality, they do not
“state explicitly what is meant by a `genuine link´ nor … [do they] … specify what
consequences follow in the absence of such a link.” (Churchill, 2000, p. 42). The
travaux préparatoires revealed the same uncertainties. UNCCROS which stipulates
conditions of participation by nationals in the ownership and or manning of ships,
endorses flag state prerogative to decide on such matters.

The degree of

concordance in subsequent practice by parties of GCOHS and UNCLOS was so
diverse that no common understanding was evident. It is also not clear whether
genuine link is a pre-condition for the grant of nationality or a duty which arises out
of the grant of nationality.
The ICJ ruling in the IMCO Reference case26 asserted that the nationality of ships
was based on conditions set by the flag state, discarding attempts by European
AMS to overturn this principle. In respect of the consequence of non-recognition

26

The IMCO reference case was adjudicated by the ICJ to determine if Panama and Liberia were
among the eight ``largest shipowning nations´´ and therefore entitled to sit on the IMO Council. The
international Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) is the former name for the International
Maritime Organization (IMO).
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advocated by TMS, Churchill (2000, p. 49) cites the decision of the International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in the M/V Saiga (No.2) Case (St. Vincent and the
Grenadines v. Guinea) that genuine link is intended to secure effective
implementation of flag state obligations “and does not establish criteria by reference
to which the validity of registration [and hence nationality] of ships may be
challenged.” Other case rulings, typified by the European Court of Justice, showed
total lack of uniformity in legal interpretations of genuine link.

The opinions of scholars are so diverse that no dominant view emerges. (Churchill,
2000, p. 37). Lamenting the obscurity and elusiveness of the meaning of genuine
link, Mc Connell (1985), writing in the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, titled
her publication: “… Darkening Confusion Mounted Upon Darkening Confusion: …”.

Churchill (2000, p. 4-5) concludes that “there is no consensus … as to what is
meant by genuine link or the consequences that flow from its absence … ”. State
discretion rather than any single or obligatory criterion characterises the
genuineness of the link between the flag state, the ship and its crew. The existence
of genuine link, though not a perquisite for the grant of nationality, is best
demonstrated through effective flag state survey and certification and other controls.

The introduction of genuine link into international maritime law has resulted in more
confusion than enlightenment.

Driven by defence of national interests with

objectives to curb the growth of open registries, TMS attempted to apply court
decisions concerning diplomatic protection in the Nottebohm case to nationality of
ships. This concept of convenience was ill conceived. After 40 years genuine link
has yet to be established as an effective precept in international law and there is
great uncertainty that it ever will.

4.5

Port States Versus Open Registry States

In light of flag state underperformances referred to earlier, provisions for control of
ships by port states were enshrined in international maritime conventions in the
1970’s. Worried about incidents which could pollute their coasts and ports as a
result of incompetent foreign crews on sub-standard ships, western European states,
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along with Canada, became dissatisfied with enforcement by FOCs. In 1982 these
states established the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control
(Paris MOU) which they regarded as the final safety net for control of ships.
(Özçaryir, 2001, p. 93). Several port state memoranda, styled after the Paris MOU,
have since been established. Hindell, in a damning exposé of FOC failures, called
for the existing ship regulatory regime to be strengthened. In his view:
When the member states of the IMO put on their rule-making hats they
are at their most benign and most constructive. It is when they go home
to exercise their `national sovereignty´ by applying these regulations
that the feet of clay appear. Failure to carry out their pledges and their
obligations can be excused as `sovereign independence´ or `selfgovernment´ but it ought to be described bluntly as incompetence,
idleness greed or indifference to the consequences of inaction. (Hindell,
1996, p. 371).

Ships were arriving in European ports in astonishingly poor condition. Most of the
FOC “commercial registries” were more concerned with attracting tonnage for
revenue generation while they took a relaxed view of their obligations to regulate
ships.

The Paris MOU, brought the most effective and uniform enforcement to

international shipping. Its success lay in the eventual adoption of a public name and
shame policy, although the European port state control (PSC), initially fearful of
being sued by flag states, was slow to point the finger. (Hindell, 1996, p. 374)

The Paris MOU has continued this publicity policy with reports publicising substandard ships as “rust bucket of the month” detailing ship detentions, rating flag
states into categories ranging from very high risk to low risk and placing them into
black, grey and white lists.

Paris MOU, US Coast Guard and the Tokyo MOU

statistics show a pattern of underperformance by most AMS. Echoing the same
concerns as Hindell, the Paris MOU (2001, p. 5) concludes that “notorious flags” are
concerned more with revenue collection than safety standards while others seem
satisfied to remain on the black list.

Despite his condemnation of FOCs, Hindell (1996, p. 380) exposes UK conflict of
interests embodied in a proposal to IMO, albeit under the euphemistic labels of
“tactical error” and “whingeing”. A March 1996 UK proposal to an IMO drafting
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group, aimed at raising the standard of flag state performance, suggested that
registries should submit themselves to independent audit and those that did not
improve should have their activities restricted. In it, the UK complained that FOCs
had an unfair advantage.

Hindell also contradicts himself. Exposure of UK anti-FOC interests along with his
statement that European PSC “does not really want the work without the revenue”
(1996, p. 380) runs counter to his earlier statement that “traditional flags … prime
purpose is to promote shipping and employment and to regulate the industry to a
proper standard, rather than make money” (1996, p. 373).

Apart from this direct

contradiction regarding revenue/money, Hindell seems not to take cognisance of the
fact that promotion of employment in shipping is about economic gain.

Hindell attributes abatement of European PSC fear of legal action by flag states
solely to the strategy of publicly exposing FOC shortcomings. However, Kasoulides
(1993, p. 21) explanation that “[t]he authority of port states has also been limited by
the reasonable expectation that excessive measures by port state would result in
regulatory retaliation by other states” is a factor for consideration. Although FOCs
have the majority of ships on their registries, port states are at the centres of
commercial activity. So even if European PSC act over zealously, as they are often
accused of doing, they are no longer fearful of retaliation that could be significantly
injurious to their economies.

PSC threat of detaining or banning a ship holds

enough economic persuasive power to ensure compliance with their wishes. Cases
are known where PSC officers have detained ships and ordered them to purchase
replacement equipment from their private firms.

The prospect of ships being

banned from European ports or detained at considerable revenue loss may be
considered too high a price to pay for attempting to expose or take legal action for
PSC excesses.

4.5.1

The Maritime Aspirations of the United States

After the US won its independence from Britain in 1790, it went into isolation and
began putting in place institutions designed to ensure its sustained development.
By the early 20th century, the US had developed its naval resources and expanded
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its political sphere of influence in the Americas.

It enacted legislation such as the

Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly known as the Jones Act, which required all
vessels transporting cargo between ports to be built, crewed and owned by US
nationals. The objective was to maintain a shipbuilding and ship repair industrial
base, a trained pool of merchant mariners, and assets to respond to national
security emergencies.
By the turn of the 20th century also, the US had become the world’s largest economy,
however, shipping was still dominated by European TMS. From the 1920s to the
1970s, the US supported FOC registries that it considered to be under its effective
control. This suited US interests in dealing with shipping competition from Europe.
But by 1975, when FOC registries had clearly moved into a position of primacy, the
US became the foremost and most ardent advocate for expansion of port state
powers. (Özçayir, 2001, p. 76).

The US Coast Guard Qualship 21 initiative is meant to recognize and reward quality
ships. However, one criterion for the award is that the ship must fly the flag of a
state which has less than the three year rolling average of detentions in US ports.
So, for example, if a shipowner chooses to register his ships in the state of his
nationality, his ships can never be recognized under Qualship 21 if ships from his
country’s flag have more than the average number of detentions in US ports. This
clearly limits the shipowner’s freedom of choice.

While efforts to eliminate sub-standard ships and flags must be commended and
encouraged, US PSC activities raises questions about hegemonic intent given that
US strategy to attain world primacy involved preventing other powers from becoming
equally as strong in their respective regions. It does appear that as part of a wider
US strategy of countering European competition and controlling world tonnage,
FOCs were manoeuvred into positions of prominence, only to later come under
attack from the US as they were perceived to be less formidable competitors.
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Schubert (2002, p. 5), making proposals for homeland defence in response to the
September 11, 2001 terror attacks, called for US to become a strong flag state.27 In
this regard, he identified open registries as the biggest threat to US national
interests and suggested that highest consideration be given to state incentives to
woo ships back to the US flag. In light of US dominance in military political and
economic spheres, these activities are likely to create serious concerns for AMS.

4.6

Coastal States Versus Flag States

The power of the coastal state to deny entry into its ports and territorial waters, to
ships which could endanger safety security and the marine environment, is closely
akin to the power of port states. Recent examples of such conflicts have been
manifested the cases of MV Tampa and MV Castor which were regarded as `lepers
of the sea´. The master of the Tampa had conformed to the time honoured custom
of rescuing people in distress at sea. The ship was refused entry into Australia.
The rescued personnel were unwanted refugees. Castor, a gasoline tanker,
developed cracks in its deck during a violent storm. It spent 35 days at sea in the
Mediterranean as states refused to give access to ports or sheltered waters to
enable a salvage team to repair its hull. The conflict in the Castor case, which has
placed ports of refuge high on the IMO agenda, is best summed up in the words of
the International Salvage Union: “[g]overnments have the fundamental obligation to
act in the public interest”. “It is not in the public interest to take decisions which at
best pass on risks to neighbouring states and at worse may lead to environmental
catastrophe”. (Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 2002)

Other conflicts could arise from potential hazards due to excesses by port/coastal
states.

US prohibition laws directly conflict with innocent passage.

It not only

outlawed landing of alcohol in its territory but rendered illegal its carriage into
territorial seas. The Jones Act provides for compensation to seamen injured in the
course of their duties outside US ports. This conflicts with flag state supremacy
supported in court cases since 1860’s and codified in GCOHS and UNCLOS.
(Kasoulides, 1993, p. 25).
27

Schubert’s statement was made on June 13, 2002, to the Special Oversight Panel on the Merchant
Marine of the Armed Services Committee of the US House of Representatives.
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In a pollution incident, the master and crew of a vessel could be subject to
concurrent jurisdiction of several states.

This could lead to a multiplication of

punishment. There are suggestions that jurisdiction could be exercised by the state
where the “primary effect” is felt more directly and substantially. This is still fraught
with difficulties as the effect may be equal in more than one state. As there are no
international rules governing limitation of concurrent jurisdiction this is an area of
potential conflict between flag states and port/coastal states. (Kasoulides, 1993, pp.
32-33).

4.7

Intra-Flag State Conflicts

Revenue versus safety obligations has been the single greatest intra-flag state
conflict. AMS have been accused by TMS and the more established PSC regimes
of being concerned only with revenue collection.

Other conflicts arise due to

pressures created by resource constraints. AMS are forced to give priority to social
and infrastructure development over maritime activities.

4.7.1

Overseas Representatives

Most AMS are away from the main centres of shipping and commercial activities.
They lack the requisite financial, human and technical resources to properly operate
their maritime administrations.
administration

as

offshore

Consequently, they operate their maritime
registries

staffed

by

non-national

overseas

representatives. Severe conflicts arise as some overseas representatives are more
interested in private commercial gain than proper discharge of flag state
responsibilities. Hindell (1996, p. 272) describes the overseas representative of St
Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) as a “family firm as flag state”. He writes:
Besides his official duties, the Commissioner for Maritime Affairs not
only registers his own ships but has turned the organization into a family
business by appointing his son to run one office and his daughter to run
another. He is not only a proud father but also a shipowner, regulator
and a profitmaker. … St Vincent is not a small insignificant register. In
1995 it claimed 1300 vessels totalling 6.5 million gross tons. It also had
one of the worse casualty rates in the business: 24 total losses in the
last four years.
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SVG has been operating its registry under this arrangement since 1982. As at
January 2000, SVG operated the worlds eighth largest open registry, nineteenth in
overall size, with 9.65 million tonnes registered. (Institute of Shipping and
Economics Logistics [ISL], 2001, pp. 26-27, 222). After 20 years it is still rated as
high risk on the Paris MOU and is above the three year rolling average for
detentions in the US. Between 1995 and 1999 there were 24 total losses of SVG
flagged vessels. (ISL, 2001, p. 51).

Recent newcomers to ship registration reveal a new breed of “dotcom” commercial
registrars that have used internet promotions to attract tonnage and carry out online
registration without `due diligence´ being performed in respect of ships. The Tongan
registered vessel Monica, which was intercepted on 17 March 2002 with 928
Kurdish refugees, sailed under 11 different names. (Osler, 2002a, p.1). Paris MOU
(2001, p. 5) reported that Sao Tome and Principe, Cambodia and Tonga found their
way to the top of the black list in a single year. Safety at Sea International (2002, p.
4), referred to Cambodia as the world’s worst registry. In its fleet there were 25
ships wrecked or stranded, 41 collisions, 9 shipboard fires and 45 arrests since
1995. These registries are all managed by overseas representatives.

4.7.2

Classification Societies

The major classification societies have been in existence longer than most flag
states. They have at their disposal far greater expertise than any flag state today,
maintaining a worldwide network of offices staffed by technical personnel,
particularly naval architects. Lalis (2001, p. 38) sees the source of conflict with
classification societies as coming from their dual nature: “one of a semi-public body
entrusted with the task of public interest and one of a normal company seeking profit
where it can”. In their public role, classification societies, appointed as ROs by flag
states, carry out regulatory functions of surveying and inspecting ships and issuing
statutory certificates as evidence of compliance with the flag state laws and
international maritime instruments to which those states are party. In their private
commercial capacity, classification societies function in the interests of shipowners,
by whom they are paid, to ascertain conformance by their ships to the quality
standards necessary to remain `in class´ and obtain insurance coverage.
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Lalis raises the question of compatibility of roles: can classifications societies
perform both roles without compromises as public regulators given that revenue
generated from their private commercial activities finances their regulatory function
in respect of the same ships. Sceptics abound and perhaps on justifiable grounds.
In the last quarter of 1995, two of the major classifications societies, Lloyds Register
and Bureau Veritas each classified and certified one fifth of all ships that were
detained more that once in two years. (Hindell, 1996, p. 374). Paris MOU reports for
2000 and 2001 each report that “class related detentions” amounted to 22% of all
detentions.

Other commentators have accused members of the International Association of
Classification Societies (IACS) of in-fighting, citing a preoccupation with selfpromotion, rather than embracing a unified approach towards maritime safety. Osler
(2002b, p. 1), quoting Mr Anne, head of the French Classification Society, Bureau
Veritas, regarding vessel safety stated: “IACS is united behind that aim, but that
unity is strained, and global ship safety suffers, when members try, for commercial
advantage, to portray themselves better than others.” While the in-fighting among
IACS members continues, they are accused of acting slowly with respect to the
revision of standards for structural strength of hatch covers for bulk carriers. Failure
of forward hatch covers was responsible for the loss of MV Derbyshire and is
suspected of being the primary reason for the loss of bulk carriers which have the
highest rate of loss among all ships types. (Speares, 2002, p. 2).

4.7.3

Shipowners

The intentions of a small percentage of shipowners who transfer registration of their
vessels to open registries have been less than honourable.

There is historical

evidence, as shown from Carlisle in chapter 2, that some Greek owners transferred
their vessels to British and Panamanian flags to mask their involvement in
smuggling activities. In the recent case of Monica highlighted above, it is assessed
that its operation under 10 different flags and 11 separate names was intended to
mask clandestine activities. (Osler, 2002a, p. 1). Such shipowners often abuse the
confidentially associated with open registries by `disappearing into the woodwork´
behind corporate veils to escape from their liabilities, often leaving crews unpaid.
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Their ships are often poorly maintained, the primary objective being commercial gain.
This has led the Mercantile Marine Department of India to conclude that “[s]ubstandard shipping is a result of a commercial decision by someone, somewhere”.
(International Commission on Shipping [ICONS], 2000, p. 71).
Shipowners have otherwise attempted to manipulate states. During the 1970’s oil
crisis, the Independent Tanker Owners Association lobbied the US Government for
the establishment of anti-pollution legislation.
commercial gain.

The real objective was private

They were hoping that the tankers which were owned by

marginal operators would be used as floating port reception facilities. In this way,
the multinational companies and independent operators with higher capital
resources would be able to dominate the trade. (Carlisle, 1981, pp. 183-184).
Mukherjee (2000a, p. 25) relates a case where a powerful shipowner brought
pressure upon a flag state to force it to revise its list of ROs, a move that was not in
the interest of the flag state and created unease for other shipowners.

4.8

Conclusion

This chapter showed that maritime conflicts resulting from competing interests are
multi-directional and are reflective of the wide array of states, their agents and
subjects as well as multinational non-state actors involved in maritime activities.
The magnitude of the political, economic, military and social interests at stake has
led to and will continually see their pursuit in warlike fashion.

In this regard, new

strategies and strategic alliances of convenience have emerged and will continue to
evolve as the environment changes. Propaganda warfare waged by states and nonstate multinational actors has given open registries a negative image. Unresolved
conflicts between coastal states and flag states related to safety and pollution
prevention have constrained flag states in discharging their responsibilities. Within
the jurisdiction of flag states, conflicts of interests between private commercial gain
and flag state obligations have hindered Administrations in the effective discharge of
flag state responsibilities. Overall these conflicts have had and will continue to have
a debilitating effect on the performance of Maritime Administrations in AMS.
Attending to these conflicts require time and resources which they can ill afford.
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CHAPTER 5
5.0 Performance of Maritime Administration in Aspiring Maritime States
Having examined the responsibilities of maritime states as enshrined in international
law in Chapter 3 and the competing interests and their attendant conflicts in Chapter
4, this Chapter seeks to objectively assess Maritime Administrations in AMS, in
terms of their responsibilities, in spite of the conflicts and pressures upon them. The
assessment aims to ascertain if charges that FOCs have contributed to an
atmosphere of secrecy in shipping that encouraged substandard ships, is applicable
to AMS. Also, given the accusations of underperformance and bearing in mind that
maritime activities generate significant revenue, the assessment endeavours to
determine how AMS have utilized the funds generated from registry and other
activities; if their commercial considerations override safety; and if AMS have
properly utilized the support available under the ITCP.28

For the purposes of this dissertation the term pressure refers to any political,
economic, social or other circumstance, whether temporary or permanent, that
constrains AMS when performing their obligations set out in international law and
when pursuing objectives identified in connection with their national interests.
Pressure includes competing priorities internal to AMS.

5.1

The Impacts of Economic Pressures

Economic constraints facing AMS dictate that health, education, physical
infrastructure and other pressing needs must take priority over maritime affairs. As

28

The mission of the ITCP is: “To help developing countries improve their ability to comply with
international rules and standards relating to maritime safety and the prevention and control of
maritime pollution, giving priority to technical assistance programmes that focus on human resources
development and institutional capacity-building”.
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a consequence, limited funds are appropriated in support of maritime administration.
The resulting financial constraints have had adverse knock-on effects in all aspects
of

resource

allocation

to

and

performance

of

maritime

administration.

Notwithstanding economic constraints, the inescapable responsibility for maritime
safety rests primarily on flag states.

This responsibility transcends delegated

authority, imposing an ever-present obligation on AMS to assure the global
community that ships flying their flags conform to the safety, pollution prevention
and labour standards prescribed in international instruments.

5.2

Assessment Mechanisms

While the expressions “substandard ships” and “substandard flags” have gained
wide use in international shipping, there is no globally established mechanism which
assesses the performance of flag states and determines benchmarks for what is
“substandard”. Assessment criteria differ even among similar agencies. However,
regional PSC, maritime statistical institutes, intergovernmental organizations and
international shipping associations all agree that maritime safety and pollution
prevention standards are steadily improving.

Table 1 is developed for use in the assessment of AMS. It combines Flag State
Conformance Index (FLASCI), 29 2001 maritime administration details, PSC reports
and country economic indicators for selected registries/flag states.
table is adequate it has limitations.

Although this

Some information was not available or not

applicable in all categories for all flags/registries assessed. The FLASCI ratings and
PSC rating for some flags/registries, for example Liberia, show significant variation
confirming the differences in assessment criteria. The PSC ratings for some of the
smaller flags/registries show noticeable variation.

This may be attributable to

differences in assessment criteria, regional concentration of their fleets or both.

29

Alderton, T. & Winchester, N. published the results of a partially completed study that developed a
new Flag State Conformance Index (FLASCI) as “a highly accurate and robust means of measuring
the performance of flag states in a wide range of variables” with respect to compliance with their
international maritime obligations. See Alderton, T. & Winchester, N. (2002). Globalisation and deregulation of the maritime industry. Maritime Policy and Management, 26,( 1), 35-43. AMS straddle
the categories of `new FOCs´ and `old FOCs´. For a listing of flags/states by FLASCI categories see:
Alderton, T. & Winchester, N. (2002). Flag states and safety: 1997- 1999. Maritime Policy and
Management, 29, (2), 161.
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Table 1
Maritime Administration Details and Ratings for Selected Flags/Registries
COUNTRY

FLASCI
Rank
from
37

Score

ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE & FLEET STATISTICS

Category, Score
Range &
General
Characteristics

WMU
Grad

RO

Registry
Offices

ECONOMIC
INDICATORS

PARIS MOU

No. of Ave
ships Age
2001 yrs

Tonnage
2001
'000
tons

Ship & GDP
GDP Rank Category
'000 ton
for
Per
from
loss 2001 in Capita
77
2001 US $bn
US
$’000

Home Over
Seas

Risk
Level

USCG

TOKYO
MOU

Excess Rank 3-yr % Detenfactor from Deten- tion %
25
tion
(Ave
(Ave 7.76%)
2.70%)

Norway

1

84

High:

N/E

5

1

0

1,601 26

3,586

3 (1.52)

165.46

27.7

9

White list

--

-0.9

N/R

N/R

1.69

United kingdom

2

80

72 – 84

N/E

6

1

0

1,462 21

6,029

7 (1.47) 1406.31

22.8

1

White list

--

-1.72

N/R

N/R

1.32

DIS (Denmark)

3

77

N/E

6

1

0

472 17

6,603

1 (0.30)

162.81

25.5 N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

NIS (Norway)

3

77

N/E

6

1

0

762 16

19,005 1 (1.68)

165.46

27.7 N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

Netherlands

5

76

N/E

6

1

0

1,337 15

5,605

373.98

24.4

White list

--

-1.05

N/R

N/R

0.85

GIS/Germany

6

75

"Traditional
maritime nation and
second registers
that are centrally
operated and
controlled".

N/E

10

23

0

906 19

6,300

23.4 N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

Kerguelen Is. (France)

7

72

N/E

10

2

0

108 10

3,088

0

388.41

24.4 N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

Hong Kong

8

64

Medium -High:

1

8

1

9

646 12

13,710

0

162.64

1.99

Isle of Man*

8

64

58 – 64

N/E

6

1

0

275 10

6,057

0

1.51

Bermuda*

11

63

N/E

6

1

0

121 16

5,312

0

2.62

Cayman Islands*

12

62

N/E

6

1

2

144 16

2,054

0

0.93

Latvia

13

60

1

6

1

0

160 22

68

0

7.55

Estonia

15

58

2

7

1

0

191 23

347

0

5.28

Singapore

15

58

3

9

1

0

1,729 11

21,023 2 (137.3)

Cyprus

17

50

Medium

14

14

1

11

1,407 16

22,762 2 (178.5)

Malta

18

49

9

1

0

1,421 19

27,053 5 (58.1)

Netherlands Antilles

18

48

6

8

1

0

176 13

Russia

19

48

3

1

1

0

4,727 21

Philippines

21

46

66

10

1

0

1,697 24

Vanuatu*

22

44

3

10

1

14

316 17

Bahamas

23

43

41-50
"More established
open registers with
higher scores
belonging to those
states seeking EU
membership.
National registers".

5

1

12

1

1

1,312 16

Liberia

23

43

24

10

1

7

1,566 12

Antigua and
Barbuda*
Barbados*

25

42

2

9

1

1

840 12

4,688

0

0.66

25

42

5

12

1

1

68 18

687

0

2.60

“Semi-autunomous
second registers”.

53

0

1 (0.21) 1873.85

20

White list

--

-0.21

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

0

33.0

16

White list

--

0.37

N/R

N/R

4.65

b

46

Grey list

--

0.81

2

3.03

2.63

7.2

48

Grey list

--

0.83

17

11.11

0

10

35

Grey list

--

0.44

N/R

N/R

N/R

92.3

26.5

14

White list

-0.43

N/R

N/R

2.49

8.70

16

56

Black list

Med

1.6

4

3.21

6.49

3.57

14.3

59

Black list

Med

1.99

7

3.63

6.89

2.40

11.4

31

Grey list

--

0.22

N/R

N/R

0

10,248 7 (13.1)

309.95

7.7

53

Black list

Med

1.04

5

3.27

11.66

6,030 1 (1.48)

71.44

3.8

28

Grey List

--

0.11

N/R

N/R

2.84

0.21

1.3

29

Grey list

--

0.17

1

2.92

2.9

33,386 2 (41.2)

4.82

15

22

White list

--

-0.15

N/R

N/R

3.15

51,784 1 (9.33)

0.52

1.1

11

White list

--

-0.75

N/R

N/R

3.05

b

19

White list

--

-0.35

3

3.05

5.93

25

White list

--

-0.04

N/R

N/R

0

1,250

1,496

0

0

25.4

6

a

18.8

24.5

8.2

14.5

Table 1
Maritime Administration Details and Ratings for Selected Flags/Registries (Continued)
REGISTRY/
FLAG

FLASCI

ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE & FLEET STATISTICS

Rank
from
37

Score

Category, Score
Range &
General
Characteristics

Panama

27

41

19

23

1

1

6,245 16 122,352 16 (138.6)

Turkey

27

41

14

8

1

0

1,146 24

Marshall Islands*

29

36

Low – Medium:

1

11

0

7

360 14

11,719

0

Ukraine

29

36

35-36

2

N/A

N/A

N/A

838 22

1,407

0

Honduras

31

35

16

1

0

1,183 29

31

35
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The combined indicators rate AMS in the medium-high, medium, medium-low and
low FLASCI categories which generally correlate with 2001 PSC reports. Table 1
also shows that TMS with developed economies generally have higher performance
ratings. Conversely, AMS with weaker economies are rated lower. This seems to
support the view that economic and other resource constraints adversely impact
Maritime Administration in AMS.

Overseas Territories (OTs) of TMS also show

higher ratings, suggesting that there is a positive impact on their Maritime
Administrations by the “inheritance” of legal and administrative frameworks from
their parent countries whose laws are binding on them. Parent country experience
and superior resources for managing maritime affairs have accrued to OTs.

5.3

Convention Making and Implementation

Maritime conventions are negotiated among states which span the entire spectrum
of national development. Conventions therefore represent compromises consistent
with varying national interests.

(OECD, 2001, p. 29).

IMO records show that

participation by AMS in convention negotiation is less than desirable.

IMO

conference papers reveal a dearth of submissions from AMS, reflecting an underrepresentation of their national interests. Participation by AMS in meetings of the
IMO Assembly, Council, Committees and Sub-committees is often scanty, even
though a primary function of these fora is to amend existing conventions, many of
which have costs and other implications for national interests. The records of the
75th Meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee which deliberated on a draft
mandatory International Ships and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code, show 59 of
IMO’s 158 member states were not in attendance. Among them were Tonga and
Sao Tome and Principe both of which are blacklisted and rated as high risk by the
Paris MOU, and Barbados. (International Maritime Organization [IMO], 2002a).
Seven of the AMS listed in Table 1 did not participate in the Working Group which
discussed the pending ISPS Code. (IMO, 2002b, p. 1)

Starke (1989, p. 457) identifies several reasons for the non-implementation of
conventions even after they have been signed by states. They include resource and
priority constraints, poor participation in convention negotiations and lack of interest.
Administrative/governmental complications in arriving at a decision to ratify a
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convention, shortage of parliamentary time, the need for new legislation and
increased expenditure are related to resource and priority constraints. Discovery of
serious defects and difficulties with the instruments only after they have been signed
reflects poor participation in convention negotiations, probably as a result of
participation by inexperienced representatives.

Even when AMS participate in

convention negotiations, the absence of clear policy objectives that are consistent
with their national interests seems to be an underlying factor which leads eventually
to difficulties in enacting and enforcing implementing legislation. Based on the IMO
status of convention as at July 31, 2002, the independent AMS listed in Table 1 had
ratified 43% of IMO conventions compared to 73% by the five top rated
TMS/registries.30

Mukherjee (2002, p. 264) outlines that several newly independent states from the
former eastern block, Caribbean states, and at least one state in Africa have up to
date legislation made possible through the ITCP. However, his earlier observation,
(2000a, p.17) that “the principal criticism levelled against the open registry states is
that implementation and enforcement of the standards have been lacking” points to
the gap between enactment and enforcement of legislation by AMS. This failure to
enforce uniform minimum convention standards, manifested through inaction and
inadequate sanctions, frustrates international maritime regulatory objectives.

A Flag State Performance Self-Assessment Form (SAF) developed by the IMO Flag
State Implementation (FSI) Sub-Committee, to assist states in assessing how well
they are implementing maritime conventions, and to help in identifying areas for
possible assistance through the ITCP, has had an unsatisfactory response. In part,
many open registries have not submitted SAFs because they fear it would reveal
their failures to properly implement convention standards. As at 13 May 2002, only
seven SAF for AMS were submitted to IMO. Of these, only five met the January 19,
2001 deadline. (H. Hoppe, personal communication, August 14, 2002).31

30

OTs are bound by conventions entered into by their parent states. OTs would therefore have 73%
ratification rate. The percentage shown for all AMS would be higher if values of OT’s are included.
31
SAF for AMS include submissions by the UK on behalf of its OTs. For independent AMS, four
submitted SAF and two met the deadline.
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5.4

Management and Administration

AMS are accused of failing to reinvest sufficient funds in maritime administrations to
train staff including inspectors and surveyors and to hire experienced professionals
who can develop sound policy, advise on convention negotiations and provide legal
counsel. The virtual absence of publicly declared financial reinvestment policies for
maritime activities leaves observers to conclude that some AMS are “collecting the
golden eggs but starving the goose that lays them”. AMS which have made least
use of the ITCP to secure training in maritime administration for their nationals at the
World Maritime University (WMU), generally have the lowest all round rating by PSC
and other assessment mechanisms. As at 2001, Belize had no WMU graduates,
Tonga had one, St Vincent and the Grenadines two and Sao Tome and Principe
three. In contrast, states with the highest graduate count per unit of registered
tonnage generally have better higher ratings.

There are some exceptions.

Cambodia which has 11 WMU graduates as at December 2001, but is rated among
the world worst flags/registries, appears to validate the conclusion made by
Morrison (1997, pp.197-198) that failure to benefit is due to “bureaucratic inertia”,
where the advice which is or can be provided by those graduates is not appreciated
by persons in authority.

As shown in chapter 4, Cambodia also has problems

related to overseas representatives.

The Maritime Administrations of the TMS that are rated higher in Table 1 are all
semi-autonomous bodies with clear mandates, within which, or from which, the
assignment of commercial and regulatory functions are separated. This supports
the view that tightly structured Administrations that are less hindered by bureaucracy
are better able to achieve MSEP and commercial objectives, in response to the
dynamic needs of the maritime industry. In contrast, the Administrations of lowerrated AMS are often very small and staffed by generalists who are required to
provide oversight for both regulatory and commercial activities.

This introduces

conflict prioritising functions which is exacerbated when they have to control multiple
overseas agents.

Where AMS have appointed representatives and agents to act on their behalf, “[i]t is
incumbent upon each flag state [A]dministration to have at least that degree of
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resident expertise that is necessary to discharge the oversight function”. (Mukherjee,
2000b, p.113). Table 1 reveals that this is not the case in many instances. Some
AMS have no home-based Administration to carry out oversight functions while
others appear overwhelmed with multiple overseas representatives and ROs.

While overseas representatives have been accused of pursuing private commercial
gain and ignoring the regulatory obligations of flag states, some AMS have tacitly
endorsed their actions by failing to establish mechanisms to monitor and control
their activities. Overseas representatives can only run amok where they are given
the latitude to do so by flag states. Table 1 supports the conclusion that flag state
responsibilities are better discharged when overseas agents are held accountable.
This is best demonstrated by the cases of Belize and SVG which consistently have
lower ratings. Belize, a relative newcomer to maritime affairs, has 24 ROs and 41
overseas representatives, management of whom clearly overwhelms its single
home-based office. SVG, a virtual veteran of 20 years, has 17 ROs and seven
overseas offices which operate without control from at home. AMS which have
better ratings by PSC and other indicators, for example, OTs, Antigua and Barbuda
and Barbados, have home-based offices, fewer ROs and less overseas agents.

`Flag hopping´ in the absence of `due diligence´ and stringent registration
procedures have encouraged maritime fraud associated with `phantom ships´,
where vessels and their cargoes `disappear´ and are resold without trace. With their
histories expunged and shipowners untraceable behind shell companies, these
ships become potential `instruments of terror´ to be use in armed robbery, piracy
and worse deeds. This has prompted development of an IMO resolution and calls
from the IMO Secretary General urging governments “to exhaust all means
available” to verify the identity of ships before registering them and to accept “only
original papers documents or electronically submitted documents whose authenticity
has been verified, and to encourage greater vigilance …”.

(IMO, 2001a, p.18).

According to Osler (2002a, p. 1) Monica referred to in chapter 4, sailed under 10
different names registered with seven (7) different flag states, five (5) of which are
AMS listed in Table 1. The absence of `due diligence´ has led to accusations of
harbouring substandard ships. Lower rated AMS in Table 1, which rely exclusively
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on overseas representatives, have older fleets.

This appears to support the

conclusion that there is less than judicious pre-registration vetting of ships.

5.5

Technical Services

Given their limited technical resources and relative inexperience, AMS have
delegated the vast majority of ship surveys and certification to classification
societies which they have designated as ROs.

There are many classification

societies worldwide with a wide range of standards. The larger, more established
classification societies that are members of IACS are, supposedly, more reputable
as they have a common written code of ethics. “However, in the absence of flag
state supervision, and control some societies are known to have accepted ships that
have been in breach of regulations …”. (OECD, 2001, p. 30). Paris MOU (2002,
p.5) attributes 78% of all class related detentions to classification societies acting on
behalf of black listed flags. Table 1 also shows that AMS which have fewer and
more established classification societies as ROs have better performance ratings.
EU states, having assessed the power and influence of classification societies, have
elaborated common standards to monitor their performance rather than attempting
to control classification societies on their own.

Survey and certification of smaller ships to which many technical conventions do not
apply on account of their small size is not a lucrative activity. They have therefore
been avoided by classification societies. These ships must therefore be surveyed
and certified by national Administrations. ITCP has assisted with the development
of procedures and training of personnel in survey and certification for these `nonconvention ships´. The ITCP Report for 2001 reveals that some AMS still depend
exclusively on classification societies for convention size ships and have not
developed home-based Administrations with the requisite vessel survey and
certification expertise.

They are therefore unable to discharge their obligations

under international law for maritime safety in respect of `non-convention ships´.

Regional PSC, established with support from ITCP, also record a very low level of
involvement by AMS. In the Pacific, the Marshall Islands are not members of the
Tokyo MOU. The Tokyo MOU 2001 report does not attribute any PSC inspections
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to Vanuatu which is a member state.

In the Caribbean, Cayman Islands and

Barbados are the only AMS that are members of that regional MOU and conduct
PSC activities. Belize, Bermuda and SVG still have not accepted the regional PSC
MOU. They only have observer status. They do not conduct any PSC activities.
Antigua and Barbuda and the Netherlands Antilles are members but they do not
conduct any PSC activities. These AMS all have PSC inspectors trained under the
Caribbean Ship Inspector Training Programme which is supported by the ITCP.
(L. Bennett, personal communication, August 20, 2002).

5.6

The Human Factor, Safety and Environmental Protection

5.6.1

The Regulatory Mechanisms

The summation below made in a 1991 study commissioned by the Marine
Directorate of the UK Department of Transport, followed the investigation of
accidents involving tragic loss of life.32
While casualties can never be completely eliminated there is
nevertheless a growing feeling that present rates of casualty are still
unreasonably high. When everything else has been looked at and tried
– newer designs, better technical aids, the increase in evermore
regulations and enforcement systems at every level – one thing remains
about which there is, almost universally, agreement as to the underlying
cause of casualties – the human factor. (Eriksson and Mejia, 2000, p.
7).

The study concluded that “the human element was found to be present in over 90
per cent of collisions and groundings and 75 per cent of contacts and
fires/explosion”.

(Eriksson and Mejia, 2000, p. 8).

Following the Piper Alpha

accident, the UK presented a report to the IMO calling for “Formal Safety
Assessment” (FSA) as “a means to ensure strategic oversight of safety and pollution
prevention”. (Eriksson and Mejia, 2000, pp. 23-24). The UK reports influenced a
departure from IMO’s almost exclusive reliance on technical standards and
technology research as a means of promoting safety at sea. They led to adoption
by IMO of the ISM Code, FSA, revisions to the STCW Convention, the 1997 Code
for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents and other instruments
32

The accidents include the Herald of the Free Enterprise which capsized on March 06, 1987 with the
loss of 188 lives and the July 06, 1998 fire and explosion on oil production platform Piper Alpha
stationed off Aberdeen, Scotland, that resulted in the loss of 167 lives and massive marine pollution.
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whose combined application along with ILO instruments embody the concept of safe
manning which requires oversight by flag states.

The ISM Code emphasizes corporate safety and environmental policy for safe ship
operation and pollution prevention with commitment from top management.

It

places the onus on companies to develop a safety management system through the
involvement of ships’ and shore-based personnel, supported by clear lines of
communication, procedures and guidelines.

Flag states are under obligation to

provide diligent oversight through auditing and certification.

FSA introduced a structured and systematic methodology to hazards identification,
risk assessment, risk control, decision making and cost/benefit assessment.

It

considers vessel and project over their entire life span to ensure that hazards do not
exceed acceptable limits.

The Code on casualty investigation provides uniform guidelines and procedures for
resource allocation, investigation, reporting and cooperation among states. Properly
applied, it provides a feed back mechanism that enables lessons learnt from
investigation of human error in earlier accidents to be shared among states through
the IMO.

The 1995 amendments to the STCW Convention changed its knowledge-based
criteria for seafarer assessment to competency-based criteria. This Convention also
emphasizes adequate rest, medical fitness and clear communication amongst the
crews, especially watchkeepers.

Eriksson and Mejia (2000, p. 36) also show that IMO’s work focuses on preventing
accidents as a result of fatigue which is defined as “`reduction in physical and/or
mental capability as the result of physical, mental or emotional exertion which may
impair nearly all physical abilities including strength, speed, reduction time,
coordination, decision making or balance´”. They state that the US Coast Guard
research identifies fatigue as “`a contributory factor in 33% of all critical vessel
casualties and 16% of personal injury casualties´”.
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5.6.2

Regulation of The Human Element by AMS

As at May 23, 2002, most AMS, with the notable absence of Cambodia and Sao
Tome Principe, were on the STCW “white list” having communicated information to
the IMO which demonstrated that they had given full and complete effect to that
Convention. 33

This is a manifestation of their participation in the technical,

legislative and training support provided by the ITCP and the improvement of their
legal and administrative infrastructure relating to human element and maritime
safety. However, there are concerns that “white list” status and implementation of
other instruments are mere paper exercises. After almost seven years since the
1995 amendments to STCW were adopted, the February 01, 2002 deadline for
implementation of new certificates had to be extended by six months as had not
completed the mandatory re-certification of seafarers.

In a January 2001 address to the ninth session of the IMO FSI Sub-Committee, IMO
Secretary General O’Niel stated: “[w]e should not allow it [the ISM Code] to become
merely a paper exercise”.34 (IMO, 2001, p. 8). While it is still to early to evaluate
how the Code has been implemented by AMS, the Paris MOU (2002, p. 5) recording
of a 150 % increase in ISM related defects over the last three years is cause for
concern.

Eriksson and Mejia (2002, p. 2) conclude that documents and instruments
concerning the human element are based on research conducted primarily by “a
limited number of [TMS] delegations and organizations, despite the fact that
deliberations are open to all member states of the IMO”. Non-participation by AMS
in this research seems attributable to resource constraints.

However, there is

concern that the prevention objective of casualty investigation is hardly realised as
few accidents are properly investigated by AMS and even fewer reports are made to
the IMO to share lessons learnt.
33

The “white list” is the list of parties to the STCW Convention, confirmed by the IMO Maritime
Safety Committee to have communicated information which demonstrates that full and complete
effect is given to the relevant provisions of the Convention.
34
From 1st July 1998, the ISM Code became mandatory for all passenger ships, passenger high-speed
craft, oil tankers, chemical tankers, bulk carriers and cargo high-speed craft of 500gt and above. It
became mandatory for all remaining ships greater than 500gt from 1st July 2002.
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The International Commission on Shipping [ICONS] (2000, pp. 37-65) outlines a
litany of woes concerning the global labour market for seafarers. Seafarers have
been abused or blacklisted and debarred from employment for speaking out against
unfavourable working conditions.

Manning agents illegally demand `kick-backs´

from seafarers as a condition for their recruitment. Untrained `passport holders´,
most often with limited education and fraudulent certificates, are sent to foreign
countries to join ships, thereby circumventing screening processes.

They are

among the most exploited, being paid the lowest salaries and having to work for
excessive hours without recourse to redress.

Due to their lack of training they

render ships unsafe, and are more likely to sustain injuries and be abandoned
without compensation. AMS are not the main suppliers of seafarers. However, the
probability of situations of abuse occurring aboard vessels flying their flags
increases greatly if records of seafarers are not properly managed and diligently
monitored by their Administrations. The performance of overseas representatives
in this area does not engender confidence.

According to ITF (1999, p. 11), there is a clear correlation between FOCs,
substandard ships, failure to protect seafarers’ rights, absence of social services,
abandonment and accidents.

In its opinion, shipowners, hidden behind shell

companies, that register vessels under FOCs are likely to operate substandard
ships which do not meet minimum standards working conditions. This leads to
worker fatigue and higher casualties. As shell companies have very little assets,
their ships are usually of low value and are quickly abandoned whenever there are
claims against them. Seafarers do not benefit from the social services and their
rights are not protected due to the failure or inability of FOC’s to exercise their
responsibilities as flag states. This is made worse by the large numbers of nondomiciled seafarers employed on ships flying FOCs. Figures for 1994 to 1997,
show that 10 out of 13 states with the worst records for abandonment were FOC’s
and seven of these FOCs were among the 10 flags with the worse fleet tonnage loss
in 1997. (ITF, 1999, p. 13). Of these, three (3) were AMS.
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5.7

Conclusion

Maritime Administrations in AMS have varied but mostly low levels of performance
in flag state responsibilities. Weak performances stem mainly from the pressures of
resource constraints that have left Maritime Administrations underdeveloped. Many
AMS have not taken full advantage of support available under the IMO ITCP to
strengthen their Administrations nor have they properly utilized the support provided.
Many AMS have failed to reinvest sufficient funds into their Maritime Administrations
to ensure recruitment, development and retention of qualified professionals. This
has constrained their Maritime Administrations in the area of policy development
with adverse consequences in the areas of convention negotiations, implementation
and enforcement.

This in turn, has led to an over-reliance on overseas

representatives and on ROs with little or no control over them. As a result, overseas
representatives, have, to a large extent, focused on private commercial gain to the
detriment of flag state obligations for maritime safety, security and environmental
protection. Exclusive reliance on ROs has resulted in AMS not being able to fulfil
their obligations for survey and certification of `non-convention ships´ and PSC. Use
of less reputable ROs has also adversely affected the quality of their fleets.
Regulation of the human element and safety has also had adverse effects that have
led to conditions favourable for abuse and abandonment of seafarers and to unsafe
conditions and accidents.

The foregoing has exposed AMS and their Maritime

Administrations to accusations of being concerned with commercial gain over
maritime safety and has undermined their credibility as responsible members of the
international maritime community.
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CHAPTER 6
6.0 Aspiring Maritime States and the Implications of their Choices

Having assessed the Maritime Administrations of AMS in chapter 5, this chapter will
examine the implications of their choices in the performance of maritime affairs in
light of their responsibilities under international law and the competing interests and
prevailing pressures. In the assessment, due recognition is given to the unchanging
nature of interests, the unrelenting manner in which interests are pursued and the
relation between strategies, strategic alliances and environmental changes. This
chapter therefore seeks to develop an understanding of current and likely changes
in the global maritime environment, the strategies, strategic alliances and conflicts
that are emerging and likely to emerge and their implications for Maritime
Administrations in AMS.

6.1

The Impact of Changes in the International Environment

6.1.1

Globalisation, Safety and Environmental Protection

The virtual world shrinkage caused by globalisation in the current information age
has resulted in the internationalization of individual interests beyond the
jurisdictional limits of their national states.

Protecting the seas and oceans is

increasingly viewed as an individual right. Reactions to visual depictions of birds
and sea life covered in oil thousands of miles away are as strong as if it happened in
immediate locales. Private and public intolerance to non-performance in MSEP,
particularly to pollution, is manifestly overt.

Green campaigns are becoming

stronger and more widespread. The Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines was fined the
incredible sum of US$18million in 1998 for pollution incidents in US waters. The
images of Exxon Valdez and Erika are permanently etched on the minds of maritime
and non-maritime personnel. In reaction to the Exxon Valdez spill, the US passed
its Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) that banned the entry of single hull tankers
into its waters. The EU states have installed a range of initiatives following the
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pollution caused on the southern coast of France by the Erika. US and EU unilateral
and regional stances following these incidents have influenced binding provisions
under MARPOL for global phase out of single hull tankers and their replacement
with double hull tankers.

6.1.2

The Impact of September 11, 2001

The tragic terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US were “a shocking loss
of homeland sanctity” that resulted from a breach of its national security. (Barnett,
2002, p. 43). The US, hitherto a sleeping, laissez faire giant, awoke with the intent
of finding and punishing the perpetrators and putting in place measures to prevent
any recurrence. “Fear of more attacks in the future on an even more devastating
scale, has given the US new motive for global activism, while persuading other
countries, … not to stand in its way--at least for the time being”. (Emmott, 2002).
US plans to act decisively on this matter received international backing. Quoting UN
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of IMO stated: “there can be
no acceptance of those who would seek to justify the deliberate taking of innocent
civilian life, regardless of cause of grievance. If there is one universal principle that
all people agree on, surely it is this”. He outlined that “safety and security [are] now
inextricably linked”. (O’Niel, 2001, p. 4). In June 2002, the IMO Council provisionally
endorsed a proposal to expand the Organization’s role under a new strategic plan
that will embrace security and change its theme from “safer shipping and cleaner
oceans” to “safe secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans”. (IMO, 2002c).

According to Walt (2002, pp. 9, 14). “The end of the Cold War left the United States
in a position of power unseen since the Roman Empire.” “This … gives the United
States greater freedom of action and greater influence over the entire agenda of
global issues”. The US has clearly demonstrated the resolve to use its economic,
political and military primacy to influence the global security agenda. It has signalled
its intent to prevent ships from being used by organised syndicates for piracy and
armed robbery; to traffick in arms; to commit acts of terrorism; or to transport
weapons of mass destruction. Schubert (2002, p. 3) sees the lack of transparency
in open registries as an underlying condition which could “inadvertently open the
door for criminal and terrorist activity”. He is of the view that the US Government
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should undertake measures to influence a return of US owned ships to its fleet. This
will ensure that US security, economic and political interests are served. Ships will
be available for military missions, US influence over security agendas in the IMO,
OECD, and World Trade Organization (WTO) will be strengthened and the US will
have a basis for intervening in disputes with foreign governments to protect
American maritime businesses and commercial interests.

New security measures will be implemented under the auspices of the IMO through
a revised SOLAS Chapter XI providing for special measures to enhance maritime
safety and security. They propose to remove the lack of transparency regarding
vessel ownership and prevent the use of ships for illegal immigration by `would-be´
terrorists. It will become mandatory for each vessel to carry a continuous synoptic
record (CSR), prepared and updated by its flag state, which details information
about the vessel operator. The draft ISPS Code contemplates the eradication of
fraudulent certificates, pre-screening of ships’ crews through positive and verifiable
identification cards, long range identification of ships before their entry into national
jurisdictions and a raft of port security measures designed to prevent unauthorised
persons gaining access to ships while they are in the port of any state.

Lloyd’s List of 14 February 2002, puts it succinctly: “transparency is in and

…

opacity and secrecy, for what ever reason, is out and will be automatically treated
with a certain amount of suspicion”. The events of September 11, 2001 galvanised
intolerance for underperformance in MSEP, adding a security overtone that is rooted
in justifiable fear.

6.1.3

New Strategies and Strategic Alliances

Fearful of the implications of maritime terrorism, western European states under the
auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will remain aligned with
the US on security. As the primary port states, they will rigidly adhere to the ISPS
Code for pre-screening of crews and identification of vessels as conditions for entry
into their ports. Banning of all vessels flying the flag of an AMS could be a possible
response if they are thought to be non-compliant.
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From an economic perspective, western states will seize the opportunity to act
through the OECD to oppose FOCs which, in their view, distort competition,
increase social cost and cause them to lose revenue. Tonnage tax, cited by Storey
(2000, p. 48) as “… arguably the single most important development for the future
…” and other forms of economic incentives will be proffered to woo ships away from
FOCs and back to the flags of the US and TMS. Reyes (2001, p. 1) reported that
the British fleet grew by 65% over the previous three years while Porter (2001, p. 1)
reported that EU fleet grew from 16% to 17.2% of the world fleet between 2000 and
2001.

Panama, the world’s largest open registry, has responded to the EU tonnage tax
with sweeping cuts in registration fees and annual taxes of up to 50% and 35 %
respectively. This signals further increases in competition among flag states.

Shipping associations, trade unions and others non-state entities, will seek to align
their private commercial interests with public security interests. Already, ICONS and
ITF representatives have testified before a US Congressional Committee seeking to
promote their organizations’ points of view. 35 ITF has intensified its propaganda
warfare with continued attempts to claim moral high ground. It has highlighted the
`evils´ and `potential evils´ of FOCs ranging from lack of good governance, greed
and obscurity.36

35

ITF Secretary General, David Cockroft, and ICONS Chairman, Hon. Peter Morris testified to a
Special Oversight Panel on Merchant Marine Committee on Armed Services, US House of
Representatives, in Washington D.C., on 13th June 2002.
36
As an example, during a UN investigation in late 2001 of how Liberia utilized funds from its
registry to purchase arms contrary to UN Security Council resolution, ITF blamed the US based
Liberia International Ship (LISCR) and Corporate Registry. The US State Department’s view was
that the Liberian Government, not the registry was at fault. See Nelson, R. (2001, October, 22). US set
to defend Liberia Registry against UN action. Lloyds List, p. 3. The ITF Secretary General in his
testimony sought to continue to discredit LISCR. See Cockroft, D. (2002, pp. 5-15) at
http://www.itf.org.uk/media/releases/pdf/Merchant_Marine_Panel_Testimony_Updated.pdf. In July
2001, Osler, D. reported that Royal Caribbean Cruises decision to consider removing its ships from
the Liberia registry when threatened with an ITF publicity drive highlighting human rights abuses in
Liberia was a “publicity coup of the ITF campaign even before its official launch”. See Royal
Caribbean warns Liberian register Lloyd’s List of July 25, 2001, p. 1. Brewer, J. (2002, July 15)
Liberian flag to lose Celebrity cachet Lloyd’s List, p. 3 reported that Royal Caribbean Cruises Line
and Celebrity Cruises had re-flagged their ships to the Bahamas in response to ITF publicity threats.
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In some quarters the events of September 11th also represent an opportunity for
economic actions conceived decades ago to be taken under the guise of security.
The ITF has put forward arguments for “restoring the `genuine link´ between the
vessel and the flag it flies and, in so doing, eliminate the flag of convenience
system”

(Cockroft, D. 2002, p. 20).

This argument is representative of ITF’s

relentless pursuit to replace nationality of the ship based on its flag state with
nationality of the shipowner, the ultimate aim being to change the centuries old
regime which was endorsed by the ICJ ruling concerning the nationality of the ship.
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ITFCU) to the 75th Meeting of
the IMO Maritime Safety Committee in May 2002, sought to reintroduce arguments
for the inclusion of information about the beneficial owners of ships in continuous
synoptic record (CSR) which are to be part of the new security provisions in SOLAS
Chapter XI. (IMO, 2002b, p. 9). In earlier deliberations at the IMO, it was concluded
that information about ship operators is sufficient to meet security objectives.

The arguments for inclusion of information on shipowners in CSR are advanced on
the grounds of safety and security. However, open registry states and shipping
associations

oppose

its

introduction

on

the

grounds

that

there

are

economic/financial motives, intent on discovering the identity of shipowners, their
income and their assets so that taxes could be imposed upon them. They affirm
that the vast majority of owners who have ships registered with open registries are
responsible operators. They mainly wish to protect themselves from `deep pocket´
fines and awards granted by courts which they consider to be outrageously high. If
they cannot pay these fines and awards, their assets will be liable to seizure if they
are within the jurisdiction of the state in which the award is made. Many shipping
companies are also of the view that taxes in developed countries are excessive.
Open registries have been successful because their legal systems have been
tailored to provide the services required by shipowners. They have separated, as
far as is practicable, commercial considerations from safety obligations. In some
open registry jurisdictions, unauthorised disclosure of information is illegal.
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According to Spurrier (2002, p. 3), the OECD “has launched an investigation into the
covert ownership and control of ships which could lead to proposals for a reform of
registration procedures used by flag states.” Its work may go on “to look at ways of
combating opacity … through the provision of guidelines on how to make ownership
and control transparent and at the same time preserve lawful commercial
confidentiality.” While these objectives all appear to be in concord with the interests
of AMS, they hold the potential, if misused, to undermine the nationality of ships
based on the notion of the flag state; and, commercial confidentiality which is
essential to registry operations in AMS.

Similar to CSR, the “underwhelming” response to the submission of SAFs has not
been merely a matter of neglect. AMS are concerned that some parties, which are
opposed to the open registry system, may seek to utilize their weaknesses indicated
to the IMO in the SAFs as fuel for propaganda warfare, aimed at achieving
economic advantage.

While the positions taken by some maritime actors are more strident, the creeping
expansion in PSC jurisdiction is equally a threat to the interests of AMS. As greater
jurisdiction is ascribed to port states, flag state jurisdiction is eroded.

This

strengthens the hand of port states for possible unilateral and regional actions which
could be harmful to trade and economics. Concerned with the possibility of US
unilateral actions and their adverse effects, several states have petitioned the US to
wait on the IMO security initiatives instead of acting unilaterally.

6.1.4

The Struggle for Supremacy

The post cold war supremacy enjoyed by the US will not remain unchallenged. EU
States have declared their intention to become the most competitive economy by
2010 with a subordinate transport policy that outlines maritime objectives for the
same target date. This signals superpower competition to US primacy from an
emerging EU confederation. As EU Shipping Commissioner Mrs de Palacio outlines,
the EU has asked for accession to the IMO to enable it to “use its full political and
economic weight to keep fair competition open through adopting a co-ordinated
approach and stance, using where appropriate political and shipping power”. (Gray,
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2002). Much of this is concerned with US protectionism under the Jones Act which
currently enjoys exemption from challenges under current WTO rules. Recent EU
Commission court actions against France for failing to meet PSC inspection quotas
makes clear its intent to vigorously implement sanctions allowed under legally
binding instruments when, in its view, competition is distorted.

Former eastern block countries have entered the maritime arena. Schubert (2002, p.
6), notes that Russia and China are rapidly becoming dominant as labour supply
countries. Russia, a fallen superpower, will be seeking to become resurgent. China,
the world’s most populous country, will be seeking to secure a place in modern
history as superpower. Recent experience where bids for 350 million shares in
China’s largest shipping company were oversubscribed 488 times to the value of
US$48.4 billion evidences China’s maritime potential. (Wallis, 2002, p. 2). The
member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations, acting together, will
be a formidable regional block that will present a significant challenge for maritime
dominance.

6.2

Choices and their Implications

6.2.1

The National Brand – Quality or Notoriety?

Mukherjee, (2000b, p. 110) posed what he considers a “provocative” question: “in
order to realise the most alluring aspects of the open registry system, namely the
financial advantages … can interested parties [open registry states] afford to
compromise standards?”

He also provides the answer: “Reputation and

competitiveness do not lie at opposite ends of the spectrum. To remain competitive,
reputation has to be maintained”.

“It is an unequivocal fact that compromising

standards does not pay”. (Mukherjee, 2000b, pp. 113-114).

Quality in the new

environment requires clear, unambiguous and consistent demonstration by AMS of
effective jurisdictional control over their fleets. They will be required to give full and
complete effect to the international instruments which provide the regulatory
framework for MSEP and security. The litmus test for the veracity or inaccuracy of
the Rochdale Report concerning the lack of will on the part of FOCs in controlling
shipping companies and substandard ships, will be judged by the rigour or lack
thereof with which they oversee implementation of the ISM Code.

71

Conventions will have to be promptly and consistently implemented through a
domestic legislative framework which provides adequate sanctions for offences.
Consistency is particularly important, given that a flag state can go from relative
obscurity to international notoriety on account of a single accident. Although ISL
(2001, p. 51) shows that the Bahamas, Cyprus and Panama all had significantly
higher accident rates than Malta in 1999, none of them attracted the adverse
publicity Malta did on account of the Erika alone. Lack of consistent quality will
further fuel vociferous lobbies for the exclusion of AMS from flag state activities.

Wilson’s (2001, p. 113) statement directed to shipowners, that reputation is a
precious but uninsured commodity, is equally valid for flag states. The buck stops
with flag states regarding the choice to be a reputable flag. They have the primary
and perpetual responsibility to ensure that shipping is safe and secure. The ability
to secure, retain and expand a share of the maritime market will depend on flag
reputation which will be the major determinant in AMS success or failure. On this
issue of reputable flags, “to be or not to be” is still the question.

6.2.2

Sustainable Development

The raison d’être for AMS participation in international maritime affairs is to satisfy
the socio-economic needs and aspirations of their peoples. This could be best
realised through trade, particularly, maritime trade on which their economies heavily
depend.

Ships which trade in states that fail to implement future port security

measures under the pending ISPS Code could invite the possibility of being banned
from entering major port states and trading centres. The interests of shipowners for
commercial gain, without undue attention and adverse publicity that can ruin their
reputation, will remain unchanged. They will therefore avoid non-compliant states
rather than be banned.

AMS finding themselves in the category of the non-

compliant could face trade isolation and eventual economic ruin.

Trade isolation will lead to dependency on grant aid. While aid is needed, useful
and most welcome, the world’s leading economic institutions have affirmed that the
economic impact and benefits of trade to developing states far out weigh aid. As aid
is increased, philanthropy and national interests will come into conflict in donor

72

states. Larger aid packages will come with more rigid conditions, acceptance of
which could so limit the political options of recipient states that it runs the risk of
perpetuating states that are independent by name but dependent by nature. In
these circumstances, their legitimate aspirations and socio/economic developmental
objectives would never be achieved.

6.2.3

Structure and Performance of Administrations

Maritime Administrations will be at the centre stage in protecting the interests of
AMS and in preventing risks to the maritime trade/economic activities. They will
have to lead the way in national policy development and in ensuring compliance with
international regulations. Theirs will be the responsibility to lead negotiations on
maritime conventions to ensure that the interests of AMS are served. Proactive
strategies will be required with Administrations being mindful that economic actions
can be taken under the guise of `security´.

Actions taken under a `security´

umbrella will have less recourse to appeal or redress as it is an area where states
are not prepared to relinquish sovereignty. Also, only carefully conceived strategies
will aid in mitigating the potential collateral damage from the regional/superpower
rivalries and alliances which lie ahead. Failure to negotiate effectively through the
IMO may bring home the unfortunate realities of the African parable: `when the
elephants fight it is the grass that suffers and when the elephants make love it is
also the grass that suffers´.

The timely return of SAFs, highlighting assistance

required under ITCP will also be in their charge. It has been recognized that the
range of security measures required under the proposed ISPS Code will result in
substantial costs. The 75th Meeting of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee, in June
2002, recommended that the ITCP be used as the main vehicle for providing
assistance to developing states to enable them to implement security provisions.

Retention of unresponsive, bureaucratic, Administrations which fail to perform will
not be in the interest of AMS. Administrations will therefore need to be reviewed
and restructured to ensure optimal performance in all aspects of MSEP and security
in respect of convention size ships, `non-convention size ships´ and PSC.
Commercial and regulatory functions will have to be assigned to avoid internal
conflicts. ROs and overseas representatives who place private commercial gain
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ahead of flag state obligations will have to be weeded out.

IMO guidelines to

monitor and control ROs will have to be strictly adhered to. Professional staff will
have to be employed. Funds generated from maritime activities will have to be set
aside for development of maritime administration. In this regard, the Cambodian
Government has commenced the overhaul of its Maritime Administration by bringing
the registry under direct government control, thereby removing its reliance on the
overseas representative. (Associated Foreign Press, 2002).

Osler (2002c, p. 1) reports concerning Tonga and the vociferousness of the
propaganda campaigns.

In the embarrassment suffered following intercept of

Karine A with 50 tonnes of munitions and Monica with nearly 1000 refugees, Tonga
was forced to announce closure of its registry.

The registry operator correctly

pointed out that illegal trafficking in arms, narcotics and immigrants are the decisions
and responsibilities of shipowners. He felt that the Tonga registry was being made a
scapegoat by more powerful states. He argued that the Tongan registry was the
only one that made vessel ownership information available over the Internet. ITF
however was “delighted” with “the defeat of those who know that criminal activities
are best carried out under an FoC”. In ITF’s view “[a] government had realised that
being a flag of convenience is incompatible with good governance”. Tonga felt the
considerable impact of having a tarnished reputation, born of suspicion, in a
changed security environment where its overseas registry representative failed to
exercise `due diligence´ and control over ship operators.

6.3

Conclusion

Globalisation, the information age and the events of September 11th 2001 have
defined a new era of maritime affairs where safety and security are synonymous and
competition among maritime actors has intensified. There is increased intolerance
for underperformance in MSEP and security and a demand for full compliance with
existing maritime and pending security instruments. This requires consistent delivery
of quality service by AMS that must be manifested in effective jurisdictional control
over their fleets. In many cases, AMS would need to engage in swift reform of their
Maritime Administrations to bring quality management to their maritime activities and
to ensure that their national interests are properly represented.
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Maritime

Administrations in AMS will have to employ proactive strategies piloted through IMO
in order to protect national interests.

Tonnage tax advantages held by open

registries are being steadily eroded and their basis being attacked. Information
technology has given new possibilities for propaganda warfare aimed at eliminating
open registries. The consequences of failure are trade isolation, economic ruin and
non-achievement of the legitimate socio-economic and political aspiration of their
peoples. The price for inaction and underperformance in MSEP and security is too
high even to risk it.
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CHAPTER 7
7.0 Conclusions
Traditionally, maritime interests, which provided a significant source of wealth, had
been advanced and defended by means of outright war. Public and private interests
were allied under the flag of TMS. The internationalization of shipping through the
registry system led to the participation in maritime affairs by non-traditional maritime
states including AMS.

This resulted in increased competition and conflicts of

interests among state and non-state maritime actors with public and private
commercial interests respectively. The open registry system threatened the political,
economic and military foundations of power in TMS and undercut economic wealth
which they exclusively enjoyed.

Although acceptance of the UN Charter constrained states in the methods used to
defend their national interests, new forms of warfare were employed. Efforts to use
conventions to overturn the rights enshrined in the existing international legal regime,
under which AMS participate in maritime affairs, have been relentless.
Consequently, the nationality of ships based on the flag state has come under
sustained attack. In the last 30 years, the jurisdiction of port states, as outlined in
international maritime instruments, has steadily increased. A relentless propaganda
warfare has been unleashed to influence public opinion against the open registry
system in an attempt to secure its eventual elimination.

Many TMS are now operating international registries with fee structures and
incentives similar to open registries. Panama, the largest open registry state, has
responded with fee cuts. These developments will lead to increased competition
and conflicts in maritime affairs. Future alliances and conflicts between existing and
emerging maritime powers could adversely affect the interests of AMS.
Globalisation and the events of September 11, 2001 have resulted in increase
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intolerance for under-performance in MSEP and security which are now twinned.
New maritime security measures contemplated under the pending ISPS Code will
institute sanctions which could result in trade isolation, economic ruin and
subversion of the developmental aspirations of AMS. These measures also import
the potential for misuse to achieve economic objectives.

Conflicts that resulted from competing interests have had a mixed but mostly
negative impact on Maritime Administrations in AMS. Publicity campaigns by port
states and international organizations and the response of the international public to
safety and environmental issues have resulted in a steady rise in maritime safety
and environmental standards.

By keeping AMS embattled, the conflicts have

resulted in the use of resources they can ill afford. Unresolved conflicts between
flag states, on the one hand, and coastal and port states on the other, hold the
potential to constrain AMS in executing their duties and responsibilities. Concerns
about economic action being taken under the guise of safety issues have made
AMS slow to accept measures proposed in international maritime fora.

While

conflicts and competing interests have adversely affected the performance of
Maritime Administrations in AMS, they will in reality, remain a permanent feature of
international maritime affairs.

AMS have demonstrated varying levels of performance but some have underperformed in all aspects of maritime affairs. This has resulted primarily from weak,
underdeveloped Maritime Administrations that are generally constrained by resource
limitation characteristic of their developing economies and their limited maritime
experience. Weaknesses in Maritime Administrations have been compounded to a
large degree by failure to properly utilize available technical support through the
ITCP; insufficiency of funds reinvested in maritime activities; and over-reliance on
and inadequate controls over ROs and overseas representatives, who have
neglected flag state obligations to serve their private commercial interests. The
failure to reinvest in Maritime Administrations, along with inadequate monitoring and
control of their agents, have opened AMS to criticisms of neglecting their maritime
obligations for commercial gain and undermined their credibility within the
international maritime community.
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Ultimately, successful discharge of AMS maritime responsibilities must be
consistently manifested in effective jurisdictional control over their fleets and in
optimal performance in all aspects of MSEP and security in respect of convention
size ships, `non-convention size ships´ and PSC. This will influence their reputation
which will in turn determine their success or failure. The power to determine quality,
reputation and eventual success or failure resides primarily with AMS through the
choices they make in the conduct of their maritime affairs.

Given the potential for disruption of trade and economics and their resultant adverse
impact on the general well being of the peoples of AMS, it is incumbent upon AMS
to ensure, as a matter of highest priority, that their Maritime Administrations have
the resources to properly discharge state responsibilities and to promote and defend
national interests.

They must be equipped with the necessary human, financial,

technical and material resources to support the delivery of quality services in all
spheres of maritime affairs.

Having appropriately qualified professional staff will be the single most important
factor for Maritime Administrations. They must be supported with the necessary
material resources, including IT resources, required to service technical and
administrative needs. As a matter of standard policy, a proportion of the funds
generated from maritime activities should be set aside for reinvestment in and
development of Maritime Administrations and to enable participation in the
deliberations of international organizations to promote and defend national interests.

Support available under the ITCP should be utilized to the fullest possible extent,
particularly in the areas of human resources development through WMU, regional
programmes for training of inspectors and implementation of security measures that
will become mandatory under the pending ISPS Code.

Administrations should be reviewed and restructured to ensure that they are
responsive to the safety and security needs of the maritime industry and the
international community as a whole. Where they have not yet done so, AMS should
establish their Administrations as semi-autonomous home-based entities with
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commercial and regulatory functions separated internally. Home-based, centrally
controlled, Maritime Administrations will better facilitate the development of policies
consistent with national interests and objectives.

They should be structured to

ensure optimal delivery in the areas identified below.

Registry services should be strengthened to ensure that there is `due diligence´
prior to the registration of ships. This will lower the probability of accidental breach
of the safety and security net and the possibility of human, environmental, and
economic consequences of disastrous proportions. Registration should be done only
on the strength of verifiably authentic documents and receipt of confirmation that
vessels are not registered under any other flag.

Vessel particulars should be

verified through physical checks. Overseas representatives should be kept to the
minimum necessary. AMS should sever the services of overseas representatives
who place private commercial gain ahead of flag state obligations. Ship operators
must be held to properly account for their operations.

They must conform to

standards laid down in national and international law.

Technical services delivered through ROs should strictly adhere to IMO guidelines,
using written agreements as their basis.

Only reputable classification societies

which are able to provide high quality services and which conform to a code of
ethics, acceptable to AMS, should be designated as ROs. National home-based
inspectorates should be developed to discharge state obligations in respect of `nonconvention ships´ and PSC.

Monitoring and control are integral to quality assurance upon which the reputation
and eventual success or failure of ASM will depend. All AMS should establish the
capacity to regularly monitor ROs and overseas representatives through regular
audits and surprise inspections to verify that they are performing in accordance with
agreed standards.

Seafarer services will be key to the reputation of AMS and vital to their success.
First and foremost they must be protected on humanitarian grounds from abuse and
exploitation. Seafarers also give open registries an economic advantage through
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the freedom of choice given to shipowners to hire internationally. Without seafarers,
the attractions held by open registries will significantly diminish.

Services for

seafarers must be holistic, embodying the social conditions of their employment and
qualifications in keeping with STCW.

Maritime Administrations should maintain

detailed personal records of all seafarers including information about their
competencies/certifications. They should confirm that all personnel are qualified for
the positions in which they are to serve. The use of verifiable identification cards
and tamper proof certificates should be introduced as means of eliminating maritime
certificate fraud. Records of manning agents should also be maintained to facilitate
control and prevent exploitation. The social conditions of ships should be verified to
ensure that they conform to the required ILO standards.

Security services will be required in tandem with other services. Administrations
should have the capacity to respond to security inquiries and information requests
on a full time basis.

Protocols and procedures for requesting and exchanging

information should be developed to ensure timely responses.

These must be

consistent with the national interests of AMS and must meet the needs of the
international community. Access to immediate legal advice will be vital, making
home-based Administrations all the more necessary.

The new international

maritime safety regime will have to be underpinned by a domestic legal framework
which makes provision for extradition of perpetrators of maritime crimes and for
sanctions befitting the severity of such offences.

Strategies and strategic alliances will have to evolve as the environment changes.
To aid in promoting and defending their national interests, in light of the magnitude
of the threats, AMS should forge alliances among themselves, with other open
registry states and with other maritime actors which have compatible goals. AMS
would need to vigilantly monitor proposed security reforms in ship registration
procedures, collectively through the IMO and other fora, to ensure that they do not
undermine the nationality of ships based on the notion of the flag state; and
commercial confidentiality which is essential to their registry operations.
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